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ABSTRACT
U.S. regulation of public investment companies (such as mutual funds)
is based on a notion that, from a governance perspective, investment
companies are simply another type of business enterprise, not substantially
different from companies that produce goods or provide (noninvestment)
services. In other words, investment company regulation is founded on
what this Article calls a “corporate governance paradigm,” in that it
provides a significant regulatory role for boards of directors, as the
traditional governance mechanism in business enterprises, and is “entity
centric,” focusing on intraentity relationships to the exclusion of superentity ones. This Article argues that corporate governance norms, which
came to dominate U.S. investment company regulation as a result of the
unique history of U.S. investment companies, are poorly-suited to achieve
the goals of investment company regulation. In particular, the corporate
governance paradigm has given rise to a number of regulatory weaknesses,
which stem from investment advisers’ effective control over investment
company boards of directors and courts’ deference to state corporate law
doctrine in addressing investors’ grievances. Accordingly, investment
company regulation should acknowledge that investment companies are
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not merely another type of business enterprise with the same challenges
and tensions arising from the separation of ownership and control that
appear in the traditional corporate context. Toward that end, this Article
contends that policymakers should view, and regulate, investment
companies as an avenue through which investment advisers provide
financial services (investment-advisory services, in particular) to
investors—and should view investment company shareholders more as
advisory customers than as equity owners of a firm. This “financial
services” model of regulation moves past the entity focus of corporate
governance norms and, therefore, permits dispensing with governance by
an “independent” body such as the board of directors. More importantly, if
adopted, this model would remedy some of the more significant problems
plaguing U.S. investment company regulation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine, if you will, a corporation that has directors and shareholders
but that neither produces any products nor provides any services. The
corporation also has no employees: there is no CEO in charge of the
corporation’s activities, no CFO to mind the corporation’s balance sheet,
and no managers, salespersons, or administrative assistants carrying out the
corporation’s day-to-day activities.1 Yet the corporation is far from inert. It
takes on liabilities and earns income and, if all goes well, shows a healthy
profit at the end of each accounting period. One might wonder how, with
no personnel at all, this corporation is able to accomplish anything, much
less generate returns for its shareholders. The answer is that this
corporation is able to pursue its activities through having submitted itself to
the control of another firm, a vendor of sorts that the corporation has
contractually engaged, much as any firm might engage an accounting firm
or a law firm. That other firm is the corporation’s investment adviser,
without which the corporation would not exist, let alone function. The
corporation is a public investment company, also commonly (and
somewhat inaccurately) known as a “mutual fund.”2
Perhaps the foremost goal of investment company regulation is
making the investment adviser accountable to the investment company and,
specifically, obligated to further the investment company’s interests over
the adviser’s own interests.3 In the United States, that regulation has
assumed a peculiar form, however—one that ultimately undermines its
objectives. In particular, U.S. investment company regulation reflects a
presumption that investment companies are business enterprises, not
essentially different, from a governance perspective, from Procter &
Gamble, Microsoft, or Facebook.4 Regulation turns on the fact that a
company is the regulatory subject, rather than that the company exists
1. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. This absence of personnel stands in sharp contrast
to typical companies, in which “the managers are full-time employees working for the benefit of the
company’s owners.” See John P. Freeman, The Mutual Fund Distribution Expense Mess, 32 J. CORP. L.
739, 746 (2007).
2. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
3. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (2006); Jennifer S. Taub, Able
but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J.
CORP. L. 843, 857 (2009) (observing that investment company regulation attempts to address perceived
abuses through “mandated disclosure to investors, prohibitions on self-dealing transactions, governance
structure requirements, limitations on leveraging of fund assets, and bans on other transactions that
would allow the fund sponsor (the Adviser) to siphon off investor money,” and through “the
requirement of mutual fund shareholder consent before changes are made to the fund objectives”).
4. See infra Part II.
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solely to facilitate the provision of investment advice to its shareholders.5
By virtue of that focus, regulation bestows the primary regulatory role on
investment company boards of directors, and thereby pursues its objectives
through board control and oversight.6 In other words, U.S. investment
company regulation embodies a “corporate governance” regulatory
paradigm.
This Article argues that the corporate governance regulatory fiction
that investment company regulation embraces underlies many, if not most,
of the significant problems that have come to overshadow the immense
potential of the U.S. investment company industry. Among the oft-cited
problems are that boards lack the expertise necessary to effectively monitor
regulatory compliance and uphold shareholders’ interests;7 that shareholder
apathy and complacency impede their exiting poorly managed funds;8 that
investment company management fees charged by investment advisers are
excessive;9 that investment companies are not sufficiently subject to the
forces of competition and market discipline;10 and that, overall, investment
company shareholders are subject to abuse at the hands of those controlling
and investing their assets.11 This Article contends that such problems could
be substantially mitigated if the norms guiding U.S. investment company
regulation more accurately reflected the nature of the relationship between
investment advisers, on one hand, and investment company shareholders,
on the other.12
5. As Alan Palmiter points out, although the U.S. investment company regulatory regime
“effectively assumes that mutual funds will be organized as (or along the lines of) a corporation,” it
does not require investment companies to assume the corporate form. Alan R. Palmiter, The Mutual
Fund Board: A Failed Experiment in Regulatory Outsourcing, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 165,
167–68 (2006). Some investment companies, for example, are formally organized as statutory trusts,
rather than as corporations. However, regardless of whether the fund is structured as a corporation or as
a trust, “[t]here must be a board of directors (or its equivalent) to oversee fund operations,” as well as
“shareholder voting to elect board members and approve fundamental changes.” Id. at 168–69
(footnotes omitted).
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a passim.
7. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
8. See Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds:
Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q.
1017, 1035–36 (2005) (observing that “[m]oney does not exit poorly performing funds with the same
velocity” as it enters well-performing funds).
9. See A. Joseph Warburton, Should Mutual Funds Be Corporations? A Legal & Econometric
Analysis, 33 J. CORP. L. 745, 753 (2008).
10. See Lyman Johnson, A Fresh Look at Director “Independence”: Mutual Fund Fee Litigation
and Gartenberg at Twenty-Five, 61 VAND. L. REV. 497, 505–06 (2008) (arguing that a number of
factors limit the ability of competition to bring down the fees imposed on investors).
11. See infra Parts II.B, III.A.
12. The difficulties apparent in U.S. investment company regulation are all the more acute given
the backdrop of an increasingly global investment arena, in which investment companies (regardless of
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The reform project this Article undertakes is critical.13 Among the
institutional investors that have come to dominate securities investing,
investment companies are the primary repositories of the investment capital
of retail investors, serving as intermediaries between those investors and
securities of public companies in which investors seek to hold economic
interests.14 Indeed, a significant percentage of U.S. households hold
investments in mutual funds and other publicly offered and traded
investment companies, whether directly or through employee pension
funds.15 In an institutionalized investment universe, therefore, investment
companies should be a core regulatory focus because securities regulation
(appropriately) is more concerned with retail investors than with
“sophisticated” investors, however “sophistication” may be defined.
Accordingly, investment company regulation should also be a primary
focus of creative thinking about securities regulatory reform.
In making its case for a markedly revised U.S. investment company
regulatory regime, this Article departs from the literature to date on the
the jurisdictions in which they are based and by which they are regulated) are pursuing international
investment opportunities, seeking to attract international investors, and, more generally, striving to
remain competitive with their foreign counterparts. It is conceivable that the U.S. regulatory embrace of
the corporate governance paradigm constitutes an impediment to coordinated investment company
regulation that, in turn, may hinder cross-border investment company activity. The prospect of
coordinated investment company regulation is a prospect for more efficient investment processes, more
robust global investment activity, and more significant capital formation. See Anita K. Krug, Assistant
Professor, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law, Multilateral Convergence in Investment Laws and Norms,
Presentation at the Asian International Economic Law Network 2011 Conference, University of Hong
Kong (Jul. 15, 2011) (on file with author).
13. That recent U.S. financial regulatory reform efforts paid relatively little attention to
investment company regulation is not particularly significant because the primary goal of that reform—
systemic risk mitigation and prevention—is not the traditional goal of securities regulation, including
investment company regulation, which was, and remains, investor protection. See, e.g., Alan W. Avery,
Kathleen A. Scott & Lindsey Carson, Dodd-Frank Act Attempts to Curtail Systemic Risk, 127 BANKING
L.J. 766, 766 (2010) (“One of the most cited impetuses behind the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act . . . has been the need to curtail the systemic risk potentially posed by large,
interconnected firms . . . .”); Amir N. Licht, Genie in a Bottle? Assessing Managerial Opportunism in
International Securities Transactions, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51, 104 (“[T]he very root of the
mandate for securities regulation [is] investor protection.”).
14. See Brian G. Cartwright, Whither the SEC Now?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1085, 1090–92 (2009).
15. The Investment Company Institute reports that, in 2008, “[a]mong households owning
mutual funds, the median amount invested in mutual funds was $100,000,” and, for 69 percent of
households owning mutual funds, those holdings “represented more than half of household financial
assets.” Frequently Asked Questions About Mutual Fund Shareholders, INV. CO. INST.,
http://www.ici.org/faqs/faq/faqs_mf_shareholders#significance (last visited Oct. 31, 2012); Jill E.
Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1963 (2010)
(“The mutual fund is the dominant form of intermediated investment. At the end of 2008, even after
much of the market collapse, equity mutual funds held over $3.7 trillion in assets, ninety-two percent of
which were contributed by the household sector.”).
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shortcomings of, and prescriptions for, investment company regulation by
arguing that truly coherent regulation can be achieved only by extricating it
from corporate governance norms and placing it firmly within the auspices
of securities regulation—which need not heed boundaries imposed by
notions of corporate personhood. The management of investment
companies must be seen as simply another means through which
investment advisers provide services to others, different in degree but not
in kind from an adviser’s provision of services to institutional or individual
clients, pension plans, or hedge funds. In other words, regulation should
reflect that an investment adviser has a financial services relationship to
investment company shareholders—a relationship that resembles the
adviser’s relationships to investors that engage the adviser directly (rather
than indirectly, as is the case when investors buy shares of an investment
company the adviser manages).
The result of this analysis is that an investment adviser should be
accountable for its actions not to an “independent” board of directors that
the adviser played a role in selecting and with whom it has too close a
relationship but, rather, to the securities regulator charged with maintaining
the integrity of the securities markets and to the shareholders who have
placed their capital under the adviser’s management. Notably, however,
this Article’s proposal for investment company regulatory reform is not a
proposal for additional regulation. It is a proposal for better regulation—
regulation that is more coherent and more effective in furthering the
investor protection objectives of securities regulation. Put another way, this
Article’s point of departure is that there exists a market failure necessitating
regulation of investment companies. It focuses solely on how best to
address that market failure and, in that regard, asserts that, as between an
investment company and its investment adviser, regulation should be more
directly aimed at the latter.
Part II of this Article delves into the nature and history of U.S.
regulation of investment companies and how that history informed and
continues to reinforce a corporate governance mode of securities
regulation. It asserts that, by maintaining the fiction that an investment
company is just another business enterprise that is to be evaluated and
regulated based on traditional corporate governance norms, U.S.
investment company regulation employs the wrong paradigm, to the
detriment of regulatory coherence. Part III explores how the relationship
between investment advisers, on one hand, and investment companies and
their boards of directors, on the other hand, renders boards not only
dependent on investment advisers in carrying out their oversight functions,
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but also conflicted and beholden to investment advisers—a difficulty that is
exacerbated to the extent directors lack industry expertise. Part IV explores
additional difficulties arising from the corporate governance regulatory
model that stem from courts’ deference to state corporate law principles in
evaluating not only shareholder fiduciary duty claims but also claims
alleging securities fraud. Part V introduces an alternative model of
investment company regulation—a “financial services” model—which
eschews reliance on corporate governance principles in favor of more
direct regulation of investment advisers, as investment companies’ primary
decisionmakers. Part V also asserts that regulation would better serve its
objectives by acknowledging that investment companies are another means
through which financial services providers (namely, investment advisers)
provide their services to investors (namely, investment company
shareholders).
II. THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PARADIGM
A. HISTORY (AND DEVOLUTION) OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION
The U.S. Congress set about to establish a regulatory regime
governing investment companies in the 1930s and completed the task with
the passage of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”).16 At that
time, a good number of investment companies in existence resembled, in
many respects, business enterprises that produced goods or provided
(noninvestment) services—which this Article refers to as “operating
companies.”17 They had officers, employees, and other personnel, all of
whom performed particular functions for the enterprise and were paid
salaries out of revenues earned by the company. 18 The difference between
an investment company and an operating company was simply that the
former’s assets were largely devoted to holding ownership interests in other
corporations. Given this blurring of companies providing products or
services and those investing in other companies, “investment company”
came to be defined in the ICA simply as a company as to which “more than
one-half of its assets, other than cash and United States Government
16. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to a-64 (2006). For a summary of
the history and background of U.S. investment company regulation, see Jerry W. Markham, Mutual
Fund Scandals—A Comparative Analysis of the Role of Corporate Governance in the Regulation of
Collective Investments, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 67, 69–79 (2006).
17. See SEC, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES REPORT, PART ONE, H.R.
Doc. No. 707, at 65–97 (3d Sess. 1938) [hereinafter SEC CLASSIFICATION REPORT].
18. See id.
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securities, consisted of securities other than securities of subsidiary
companies which were not investment companies.”19
To be sure, there were variations in the structure and operations of
companies falling within the definition. In the mid-1930s, the SEC, in a
report to Congress on the need for regulation covering investment
companies, chronicled a number of permutations of the investment
company structure.20 As the SEC noted in that report,
The lack of a crystallized financial opinion respecting the function of
investment companies and the absence of virtually any governmental
supervision or legal restrictions specifically applicable to their
sponsorship or formation, to the distribution of their securities or to their
management and operations explain in large part the wide diversity of
type . . . .21

For example, some investment companies had previously been industrial,
utility, or financial companies that departed from their previous areas of
operations, refocusing on investment activities while maintaining generally
the same body of shareholders.22 Some investment companies pursued the
sorts of activities that operating companies pursued—deploying their assets
to buy capital equipment, pay suppliers, and compensate employees—but
also, as part of their activities (and unrelated to their other business
activities), devoted a portion of their operating capital to ownership
positions in other companies for investment purposes.23 Still other
investment companies were more fundamentally investment oriented.24
19. See id. at 19.
20. See id. at 21–34.
21. Id. at 35.
22. See id. at 83–85; Markham, supra note 16, at 71 (chronicling the history of U.S. investment
companies and describing the Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company, which, though
originally chartered as an insurance company, began to operate similarly to an investment trust).
23. See SEC CLASSIFICATION REPORT, supra note 17, at 76–83.
24. For these companies, as suggested above, it was often the case that investment
decisionmakers pursued their role as managers of the organization (rather than as third-party
independent contractors) and were compensated much in the manner that a CEO or other executive of
an operating company would be compensated. See John C. Bogle, Re-Mutualizing the Mutual Fund
Industry—The Alpha and the Omega, 45 B.C. L. REV. 391, 391–92 (2004) [hereinafter The Alpha and
the Omega] (“The mutual fund industry began in 1924 with the formation of a truly mutual mutual
fund: one organized, operated, and managed, not by a separate management company with its own
commercial interests, but by its own trustees; compensated not on the basis of the trust’s principal, but,
under traditional fiduciary standards, its income.”). Those companies were the true “mutual” funds, a
name that remains attached to U.S. investment companies, notwithstanding how radically different
today’s investment companies are structured. See id. at 392. Indeed, “the phrase mutual funds does not
appear in the [ICA].” John C. Bogle, A New Order of Things—Bringing Mutuality to the “Mutual
Fund,” 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 471, 472 (2008).
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Despite this operational diversity, the SEC’s report revealed the extent
to which investment companies were beholden to the operating company
form. Like operating companies, these companies generally assumed a
corporate form of organization.25 They were largely organized “under the
general corporation laws of the several states, and not under any special
acts like those governing banks or insurance companies.”26 Therefore, as
with operating companies, investment companies were governed by boards
of directors. In addition, and importantly, most of the early investment
companies were of the “closed-end” type, meaning that shareholders did
not have the right, at their election, to redeem their shares on demand, in
exchange for the net asset value of those shares.27 Rather, as was (and
remains) the case for publicly traded operating companies, shareholders
could dispose of their shares only by selling them in the open market on an
organized stock exchange.28 Conversely, investors that wished to
“participate in the enterprise” after its initial offering of securities could do
so only by purchasing those securities in the open market or over the
counter.29
Each incarnation of “investment company” that Congress may have
considered as it formulated the ICA, then, was in some sense derivative of
operating companies. Particularly without any regulation governing them,
investment companies were likely seen as different in degree from
operating companies, rather than different in kind, contours that the ICA
came to follow rather than challenge. Presumably because investment
companies appeared to have emerged from operating companies,
Congress’s consideration of them, like the SEC’s, was entity centric.
Policymakers contemplated investment companies’ investor-protection
shortcomings by asking, first, about what types of investment companies
existed and what their activities were and, only second, about the sponsors,
brokers, investment-advisory firms, banks, and others that were involved in
their operations.30 Indeed, the SEC’s almost singular focus in its report to
25. See SEC CLASSIFICATION REPORT, supra note 17, at 22.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 26.
28. See Markham, supra note 16, at 74 (noting that investors in early U.S. investment companies
“bought and sold shares in investment companies through a secondary market after the initial
distribution of the shares”).
29. SEC CLASSIFICATION REPORT, supra note 17, at 26–27. To be sure, there were exceptions,
with some investment companies organized as business trusts and/or assuming an open-end structure
that allowed shareholders to come and go, similar to the model that prevails today. See id.
30. See, e.g., id. at vi–vii (showing, in its table of contents, that the SEC focused first on the
“nature and classification of investment trusts and investment companies” and, only after that
preliminary discussion, turned to a discussion of the “origins of the investment trust and investment
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Congress was on defining and classifying investment companies based on
its survey of the industry, as opposed to the alternative approach of
cataloguing and classifying those who formed and managed investment
companies and their incentives for doing so.31 Because the entity, rather
than its organizers, was policymakers’ starting point, and because
policymakers may not have perceived a distinct line between “operating
company” and “investment company,” it should be no surprise that
investment company regulation came to be modeled on corporate
governance norms.
The ICA is reminiscent of corporate codes, specifying the roles and
responsibilities of boards of directors vis-à-vis shareholders. The ICA also
provides that boards play a significant role in the ICA’s regulatory
structure, charging them with oversight of investment company regulatory
compliance.32 Through providing that role for directors, moreover, the ICA
constitutes a model of self-regulation.33 Rather than tasking the SEC with
formulating specific rules and restrictions governing all details of an
investment company’s operations, the ICA sets standards and principles
that the board of directors must uphold in overseeing the investment
company’s activities and, in particular, approving or disapproving any
particular conduct that the company’s officers and managers may wish to
pursue.34 To the extent that regulation based on self-regulation is
effective—in the sense of achieving the regulation’s goals—then the
advantages are evident. More self-regulation means less government
involvement in private activities and, more importantly, fewer government
resources devoted to oversight in the form of examinations, investigations,
and enforcement actions.35 The critical question regarding any form of selfregulation, of course, is also evident: Is it effective?
Whatever the answer to that question may have been at the outset,
given the transformation of the investment company industry in the
intervening seventy-two years, it now must be “no.” Much has changed in
company movement in the United States,” which mentioned “organizations influencing the early form
and growth of investment companies,” such as savings banks and security affiliates, and the
development of “sponsor interest” in investment companies).
31. See supra text accompanying notes 20–24.
32. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006).
33. See Warburton, supra note 9, at 750 (“The board of directors is intended to be a monitor,
protecting the interests of mutual fund investors in situations where the investment adviser could exploit
them.”).
34. See id.
35. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 110–13 (1992).
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terms of investment company activities and relationships. As noted,36
today, unlike operating companies, investment companies have no
officers.37 They have no employees. They have no administrative staff.
They do, however, have an investment adviser. That investment adviser is
not “internal” to the investment company but, rather, may be thought of as
a third-party service provider, and the terms of the relationship between the
company and the adviser are set forth in an investment-advisory contract.38
It is the investment adviser that has employees and administrative
personnel, some or all of whom may be involved with carrying out the
investment company’s day-to-day functions.39 In other words, the
investment company effectively “contracts out” for its personnel. In its
role, the investment adviser essentially dominates an investment company’s
activities, from the decisions about director nominees, to the decisions
about who will be the company’s administrator, auditor, transfer agent, and
brokers, to the decisions about what securities the company will buy and
sell.40 So much has changed, from a structural perspective, that the
corporate governance model seems extremely outdated and incongruent
with the way in which today’s investment companies operate.41
Without more, of course, the role of the investment adviser need not
have significant implications for the relationship of management (that is,
the investment company’s board of directors) to shareholders or for
management’s effectiveness in upholding shareholder interests. After all,
much as the board of an operating company may terminate and replace the
company’s CEO or other personnel, so could the board of directors of an
36. See supra Part I.
37. An investment company’s board may nominally appoint officers, such as a president, a
treasurer, or a secretary, and is required, pursuant to the SEC’s regulations under the ICA, to appoint a
“chief compliance officer.” 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1(a)(4) (2012). However, those officers are typically
employees of the investment company’s investment adviser. See INDEP. DIRS. COUNCIL,
FUNDAMENTALS FOR NEWER DIRECTORS 4 (2011).
38. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 503 (“Management of investment company assets . . . is not
provided internally but by an external investment adviser pursuant to an advisory contract negotiated
and approved by the fund’s board of directors.”).
39. See id. (“[The investment] adviser establishes and ‘sponsors’ the investment company and
provides all necessary personnel, facilities, and expertise.”); Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405
(2d Cir. 1977) (observing that the investment adviser is “an independent entity which generally
organizes the fund and provides it with investment advice, management services, and office space and
staff”).
40. See, e.g., Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 (2010) (noting in its
description of “mutual funds” that “[a] separate entity called an investment adviser creates the mutual
fund, which may have no employees of its own,” and that “[t]he adviser selects the fund’s directors,
manages the fund’s investments, and provides other services”) (citations omitted).
41. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 1031 (“Mutual funds are not enough like business
corporations for there to be any more than a facile analogy.”).
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investment company terminate the contract between the company and the
investment adviser, replacing the adviser with a more suitable substitute.42
There is, however, “more.” The critical aspect of the relationship between
an investment adviser and “its” investment company is that the investment
adviser is not analogous to an officer or employee that the board can hire
and fire.43 That is because, as suggested above, the investment adviser
typically is the company’s raison d’etre, without which the investment
company would not exist.44 A decision by an investment company’s board
of directors to terminate the investment-advisory contract is effectively a
decision to terminate the directors’ position on the board and, indeed, the
company itself.45 As discussed in Part III, this relationship of the
investment adviser to the investment company, and to its directors in
particular, effectively undermines the efficacy and coherence of investment
company regulation.46 It is also why righting the ship of investment
company regulation requires more than tweaking a few regulatory
provisions here and there.
B. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NORMS ≠ SECURITIES REGULATION
That a corporate governance model of investment company regulation
may produce dysfunctions of the scope apparent in the U.S. investment
company industry is also evident from a second, more theoretical,
perspective. The laws and norms structuring any system of corporate
governance have a purpose different from the purpose behind securities
regulation. Securities regulation exists to ensure that investors are
42. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2006) (“[I]t shall be unlawful
for any registered investment company . . . to enter into, renew, or perform any contract or agreement,
written or oral, whereby a person undertakes regularly to serve or act as investment adviser of or
principal underwriter for such company, unless the terms of such contract or agreement and any
renewal thereof have been approved by the vote of a majority of directors . . . .”).
43. See Warburton, supra note 9, at 752 (“[I]nstances of a board choosing to replace the fund’s
adviser are rare.”).
44. See Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1422.
45. See Warburton, supra note 9, at 752 (“Given [the] special relationship between an adviser
and its fund, it is unrealistic to expect an independent director to sever that relationship, particularly
since most directors are initially selected by the adviser.”).
46. Of course, we might also say that an operating company’s board is similarly influenced or
implicitly controlled by the company’s CEO (or other of management), so as to restrain the board’s
discretion in terminating that person or altering the terms that person’s relationship with the company.
See Lucian Arye Bebchuck, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction
in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 768–69 (2002). Accordingly, the
observations made here as to the overwhelming influence of investment advisers on investment
companies, and their effect on the efficacy of investment company regulation, may be apt also in the
operating company context and, in particular, regarding the conditions that foster good corporate
governance. That question, however, lies beyond this Article’s scope.
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adequately protected from potential opportunistic behavior by securities
market counterparties, whether they be issuers or broker-dealers or other
market participants.47 It seeks to force those counterparties to internalize
the costs of their activities and to correct power and information
imbalances, such as those between management and shareholders.48 In
other words, the purpose of securities regulation is to correct a perceived
market failure: investors, in policymakers’ perceptions, are not capable of
fully protecting their interests given the natural information disparities
between investors and those who would be the target of or intermediary for
their investment capital.49
Corporate governance norms, by contrast, exist independently of
market failures. They do not constitute regulation at all but instead
comprise a default legal framework for structuring private relationships.50
This framework might, indeed, be characterized as a variation of contract
law. Although U.S. corporate governance norms developed over decades
and are a product of historical practices, judicial decisions, and statutory
laws and rules, they nonetheless may be said to have a “purpose”—that
being to foster efficient economic growth and production.51 And they are,
one might say, constitutive in nature, in the sense that corporate statutes are
generally enabling rather than restrictive.52 Of course, by virtue of
corporate statutes’ (largely default) governance rules and imposition of a
(largely unwaivable) fiduciary duty of loyalty on boards of directors and
controlling shareholders, these statutes help ensure that management
remains accountable to shareholders.53 It remains the case, however, that
the motivation behind corporate governance norms is enabling private
parties to function in a manner that is socially useful.
With that distinction in mind, moreover, we can say that a system of
corporate governance is structural, grounded in notions of private law,
47. See Licht, supra note 13, at 104.
48. See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS
89 (2d ed. 2008) (noting that securities markets are characterized by an “information asymmetry”
between insiders and outsiders and that “[i]f . . . insiders and professionals are free to exploit that
informational advantage, outsiders will be reluctant to participate in the market”).
49. See id.
50. See CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 15–17 (6th ed. 2010).
51. See id. at 15 (observing that organizing as a firm helps avoid transaction costs and permits
“allocation of resources at the direction of the entrepreneur”).
52. Id. (“Most of the off-the-rack rules found in each state-provided standard form are ‘enabling’
in the sense that they provide parties with default rules that govern the relationship if the parties do not
provide otherwise.”).
53. Id. at 265, 277.

276

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:263

whereas a “system” of securities regulation is simply that: regulatory,
functioning in the name of public-law objectives. Deploying a structural
legal regime to do the work of a regulatory regime is almost intuitively
misguided by dint of the relatively mundane fact that market failures arise
where a structure already exists but where supplemental rules and
enforcement are necessary. Conversely, in light of the structural objectives
of corporate governance laws and norms, to the extent those laws and
norms seem unable to speak to the needs and goals of securities regulation,
that circumstance perhaps should not be particularly surprising. Put another
way, although investment companies, or at least many of them, are
corporations,54 regulation of them and their management (investment
advisers) lies beyond the reach of corporate law objectives, focused as they
(necessarily) are on the entity and its internal governance mechanisms.
Securities regulation, by contrast, need not be so limited.
To be sure, pursuing securities regulatory goals through
supplementing or deploying corporate norms is neither unique to the
investment company context nor necessarily problematic. Among other
things, beginning with the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, policymakers and regulators have sought
to amplify securities regulatory mechanisms applicable to public
companies through supplementing state corporate statutes with significant
additional federal obligations. Indeed, today, corporate governance “is a
matter of significant federal as well as state concern.”55 The “federalization
of corporate governance” has been increasing, moreover, particularly in the
aftermath of spectacular and well-publicized failures by corporate
management to pursue corporate interests, where those failures destroyed
shareholder value.56 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, for example,
established federal corporate governance rules to address investor
protection concerns that arose in the wake of the Enron bankruptcy.57
Sarbanes-Oxley is expressly predicated on the determination that, as
to publicly traded companies, more shareholder protection is needed.58
Among other things, the statute imposes requirements that corporations—
54.
55.

See Palmiter, supra note 5, at 167–69.
D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND CASE STUDIES 449 (2d ed. 2008).
56. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
58. Pursuant to its preamble, the purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is “to protect
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the
securities laws . . . .” Id.
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meaning their boards of directors and officers—follow specific procedures
in carrying out their management activities and oversight functions. Boards
of directors must appoint audit committees that satisfy certain membership
and operational requirements.59 Boards must also follow certain procedures
in evaluating internal controls.60 These are matters traditionally within the
realm of corporate governance that, absent the harm to shareholders as a
result of corporate governance failures, we might otherwise expect would
be left to private ordering and internal decisionmaking procedures.61 Of
course, because Sarbanes-Oxley mandates specific procedures in the name
of investor protection, there is nothing particularly constitutive about this
supplemental regulation. That is, its setting forth mandatory rules for the
furtherance of securities regulatory goals means that it does not comprise
the sort of gap-filling default rules characteristic of corporate codes.62 It is
securities regulation achieved through pulling the levers of corporate
governance. That fact is not, by itself, an independent basis of criticism:
depending on the efficacy of Sarbanes-Oxley in achieving investor
protection without unduly burdening corporate governance, the statute may
demonstrate a productive synergy between corporate governance norms
and securities regulation.
Corporate governance norms are apparent also in securities regulatory
contexts beyond crisis policymaking. Regulators deploy those norms, for
example, in the private-fund context—that is, in the regulation of
investment advisers to hedge funds, private equity funds, and the like.
Under that regulatory regime, investment advisers are to regard the funds
they manage—rather than the investors in those funds—as their “clients”
for purposes of complying with their regulatory obligations.63 That
determination derives from a corporate governance paradigm, in that the
investment adviser owes its duties to the entity (the hedge fund, for
example) rather than to the entity’s investors, much as the board of
directors owes its fiduciary obligations to the corporation rather than to any
of the corporation’s shareholders. Employing corporate governance norms
for the furtherance of securities regulation in this context is problematic
59. Id. § 301.
60. Id. § 404.
61. Lisa McCauley Parles, Susan A. O’Sullivan & John H. Shannon, Sarbanes-Oxley: An
Overview of Current Issues and Concerns, 27 REV. BUS. 38, 42 (2007) (“With the enactment of
Sarbanes-Oxley, the Federal government has stepped into many areas that were previously controlled
in-house or traditionally regulated by state legislatures and state courts.”).
62. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 50, at 15–17.
63. Anita K. Krug, Institutionalization, Investment Adviser Regulation, and the Hedge Fund
Problem, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 27–31 (2011).
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because its result is that the investment adviser does not owe its obligations
to those who have effectively engaged the adviser to provide advisory
services—fund investors.64 However, because the regulatory structure
governing private funds contemplates no formal role for boards of
directors, it is more malleable than the regulatory structure for investment
companies. Accordingly, to the extent private-fund regulation insufficiently
protects fund investors, those concerns could be addressed through
implementing additional protective measures sounding in securities
regulation.
As the next two parts elaborate, the regulatory role of investment
company boards, and the consequent formal (if not actual) control boards
exert over investment companies’ operations, either are ineffective in
furthering the investor protection goals of securities regulation or, worse,
affirmatively militate against furthering those goals. Part III delves into the
conflicts of interest embedded in the relationship between investment
company boards of directors, on one hand, and investment advisers, on the
other, and the effects of those conflicts in muting boards’ regulatory
efficacy. Part IV then shows how, in investment company jurisprudence,
the corporate governance paradigm leads courts both to defer
(inappropriately) to state corporate governance norms and to import those
norms into the investment company regulatory structure, similarly
countering the ICA’s regulatory objectives.
III. CONFLICTING INTERESTS
If regulation of investment companies should promote the stability,
effectiveness, and competitiveness of the investment company industry,
then, as much of the literature on investment company regulation in recent
years has pointed out, there is substantial room for improvement on that
front.65 Indeed, myriad scholars and other commentators have variously
observed that investment company regulation and management are fraught
with problems, almost all of which fall within the heading of
“management’s” failing to uphold its obligations to the investment
company and its shareholders.66 A number of these problems are traceable
64. Id.
65. John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence
and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 154 & n.2 (2007) (“In the last five years, mutual fund
industry critics have spoken out frequently and sharply about what they perceive to be the industry’s
shortcomings.”) (citations omitted).
66. See, e.g., Bogle, The Alpha and the Omega, supra note 24, at 418–21 (arguing that the
interests of fund managers are favored too heavily at the moment); John C. Coffee, Jr., A Course of
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to the investment company structure itself, in which the personnel
responsible for the investment company’s operations are “located” within
the investment adviser, and to the special relationship between the board of
directors and the adviser—and, in particular, that the investment company
is effectively a creature of the adviser’s making. 67 These factors both
suggest that a board of directors is unable to act as an independent voice on
shareholders’ behalf and, importantly, foster conflicts on the adviser’s part,
as well as the board’s. The board, in carrying out its oversight function,
must depend on the investment adviser to bring matters to its attention, yet
the adviser’s incentives may hinder the necessary flow of information.
Meanwhile, where the board is called upon to take action on a particular
matter, it is arguable, if not likely, that it cannot do so truly independent of
the adviser’s wishes.68 Characterizing these conflicts, respectively, as
“structural” and “relational,” this part discusses each in turn.
A. STRUCTURAL CONFLICTS
The corporate governance paradigm requires that investment company
boards of directors perform the same control functions as the board of any
corporation.69 Accordingly, an investment company board has two primary
management responsibilities, which are complementary to one another; two
sides of the same coin. First, the board has formal responsibility for making
affirmative decisions on the investment company’s behalf.70 In the
Inaction: Where Was the SEC When the Mutual Fund Scandal Happened?, 2004-APR LEGAL AFF. 46,
46–48 (2004) (explaining how the “self-interest of the fund manager” helped cause the recent waves of
financial scandals); Freeman, supra note 1, at 746–52 (noting that the investment company’s interests
frequently conflict with shareholders’ interests); Thomas R. Hurst, The Unfinished Business of Mutual
Fund Reform, 26 PACE L. REV. 133, 134–39 (2005) (outlining the various management failings that
contributed to recent scandals); Palmiter, supra note 5, at 165–66 (arguing that fund boards have “failed
to respond to the ‘cognitive biases’ of fund investors”); Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of
Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1439–40 (2002) (noting that many
observers “doubt whether the mutual fund industry is taking seriously its voting function”).
67. See supra text accompanying note 40.
68. See Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 (2010) (observing that “[b]ecause of
the relationship between a mutual fund and its investment adviser, the fund often cannot, as a practical
matter[,] sever its relationship with the adviser” and that, as a result, “the forces of arm’s-length
bargaining do not work in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as they do in other sectors of
the American economy”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because of advisers’ dominance of most
aspects of the investment companies they manage, the ICA’s requirement that no more than 60 percent
of an investment company’s directors be affiliated with the investment adviser arguably has not
provided the intended safeguard functions. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a)
(2006)
69. See Warburton, supra note 9, at 751.
70. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting
that negligent or ill-advised decisions resulting in losses mark one of the “two distinct contexts” in
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investment company context, these include decisions to appoint a new
distributor or other service provider, to pay the investment adviser at a
particular fee rate, and to approve the policies and procedures that
investment companies are required to implement under the ICA. 71 Second,
the board has formal responsibility outside of the decisionmaking context
and, in particular, is charged with overseeing the company’s operations and
practices.72 In carrying out this function under traditional corporate
governance norms, the board has a responsibility to ensure that there exists
a reporting system such that the board receives adequate and timely
information about the company’s activities—with “adequate” being
evaluated based on the company’s particular business activities and risks.73
An effective system should permit the board to become aware of, and take
action regarding, any material matters that may arise.74
Although one might envision a wide range of information that should
flow to the board of any company, certainly included in that spectrum is
information about the company’s and its personnel’s compliance with
applicable laws and regulations, whatever they may be.75 An investment
company board, however, cannot achieve exactly that type of oversight,
given that, as discussed above, the investment company itself typically
does not have officers or other personnel and, instead, relies on the
investment adviser and its personnel for carrying out its day-to-day
activities.76 From that circumstance arises the conclusion that, for
investment company boards of directors, equivalent oversight means
obtaining information about the investment adviser’s and its personnel’s
compliance with applicable laws and regulations, as well as the adviser’s
which “[d]irector liability for a breach of the duty to exercise appropriate attention” may arise).
71. See Warburton, supra note 9, at 750 (observing that, under the ICA, the board is responsible
for, among other things, “evaluating fees for services provided to the fund, policing operational
conflicts, permitting certain transactions in the absence of SEC review, and establishing the fund’s
investment objective and policy”).
72. See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (“Second, liability to the corporation for a loss may be
said to arise from an unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due attention
would, arguably, have prevented the loss.”).
73. See id. at 970 (observing that directors’ failure to implement an “adequate” information and
reporting system may “render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable
legal standards”).
74. Id.
75. Id. (holding that directors must be “assuring themselves that information and reporting
systems exist in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to
the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board, each within
its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and its
business performance”).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 36–41.
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activities as they relate to or potentially affect the investment company’s
best interests. Indeed, if the investment company board were to focus its
oversight attention solely on the inner workings of the investment
company, there would be little, if anything, to oversee, rendering the
board’s oversight function nigh illusory.
Assuming the board should instead direct its oversight focus to the
investment adviser and its activities, however, it is not apparent that the
board’s oversight capability becomes any more meaningful. That is a
product of the investment company structure and, specifically, the board’s
position within it. Because the investment adviser, rather than the
investment company itself, is the locus of investment company personnel
and day-to-day management functions, boards are effectively charged with
exercising oversight of an entity in which they have no formal role. For an
investment company board, therefore, performing its oversight function is
equivalent to overseeing a veritable black box—that being the investment
adviser, whose operations are not readily accessible to the board, either as a
matter of corporate governance or (predictably) investment company
regulation, relying as it does on corporate governance norms. As a result, in
carrying out its oversight responsibilities, an investment company board
cannot ensure the requisite flow of information through implementing its
own system but, instead, must rely on the investment adviser to bring
matters to its attention. That is a considerably more passive stance for the
board than what corporate governance norms contemplate as necessary for
effective management.77
Accordingly, the way in which investment companies are structured,
with the investment adviser being a separate business enterprise, places the
efficacy of board oversight into question. This structural obstacle,
moreover, is exacerbated to the extent that directors have limited
understandings of possible compliance weaknesses.78 Nonetheless, the
77. See supra text accompanying notes 70–75.
78. As some scholars have observed, even under more accommodating structural circumstances,
oversight that may have curtailed certain problematic activities, such as “market-timing” activities of
various larger investment company shareholders, may not have been a function that investment
company boards, largely comprised of independent directors, are well equipped to do. Under the ICA
and the SEC’s rules under the ICA, a majority of an investment company’s directors must be
“independent” of the company’s investment adviser. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg.
46,378, 46,378–79, 46,381 (Aug. 2, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270). This requirement came about
as a measure to help reduce conflicts of interest within the board. See id. Of course, given the
investment company structure described in this Article, it is questionable whether, in fact, even
independent directors are unconflicted in connection with their activities on behalf of the company. See
supra text accompanying notes 42–46. Beyond that, however, many independent directors may have
lacked the expertise in the investment company industry that would have enabled them to seek out the
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structural circumstances that render board oversight problematic in the
investment company context could be mitigated if investment advisers took
it upon themselves to ensure the flow of information to investment
company boards. The primacy of the corporate governance paradigm
means that there is no guarantee that that will occur.
For one thing, because the investment adviser is a separate entity, with
its business and operations distinct from the investment company’s, there is
no structural mandate for the flow of information from the adviser, as one
independent entity, to the investment company, as another.79 Compounding
this structural impediment is that investment advisers simply may not have
adequate incentives to seek to overcome the entity-based divide. An
investment adviser’s interests, after all, though presumably not
dramatically opposed to those of the investment company, arguably are not
aligned with them either. In particular, investment advisers, especially
those with the size and capabilities to manage an investment company,
typically manage a number of accounts, of which the investment
company’s account is only one.80 Although investment advisers owe
fiduciary duties to each of their clients,81 numerous (and perhaps
competing) sources of obligation make the prospect of conflicts of interest
unavoidable: an adviser’s obligations to one client may affect its carrying
out obligations to other clients.82 From there, it is but a short step to
sort of information necessary to know whether illegal or other ill-advised practices were afoot. Martin
E. Lybecker, Enhanced Corporate Governance for Mutual Funds: A Flawed Concept that Deserves
Serious Reconsideration, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1045, 1086 (2005). Lybecker paints a particularly bleak
picture of independent directors’ competence regarding the intricacies of investment company practices:
With respect, it is very hard indeed to understand how a mutual fund’s board of directors with
seventy-five percent independent directors, with an independent chair, meeting separately
once a year, conducting an annual self-assessment, and having access to experts can bring the
necessary skill set, surveillance tools, and adequate time to do due diligence to the tasks of
(i) rooting out a determined late-trader, (ii) understanding the nuances of stock prices in a
country facing a natural disaster that has imposed restrictions on repatriating profits, or
(iii) anticipating a change in the Commission’s position on the payment of brokerage
commissions for executing portfolio transactions to a broker-dealer to which it is also selling
shares of that mutual fund.
Id. at 1085. See also Margaret A. Bancroft, Knowledge Is Power: What Went Wrong in the Mutual
Fund Industry, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 145, 148–49 (2006).
79. This conclusion arises by (negative) implication from courts’ analyses of directors’ duty of
oversight. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–70 (Del. Ch. 1996).
80. Indeed, a premise of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), the federal
statute that governs investment advisers, is that advisers manage the accounts of multiple clients. See
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2006); infra note 81 and accompanying text.
81. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963).
82. One objective of federal regulation of investment advisers is to control advisers’ potential
conflicts. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(3)-2 (2012) (requiring that an adviser obtain written client
consent for transactions that the adviser might wish to effect between client accounts—known as
“agency-cross transactions”).
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suppose that these conflicts may dampen advisers’ motivations to provide
operational transparency to the investment company’s board—at least of
the sort that a corporate board would, and should, otherwise expect.83
B. RELATIONAL CONFLICTS
That an investment company’s adviser is responsible for the
company’s existence and the identity of its board members means that
boards are dependent on the adviser for the information that enables them
to fulfill their oversight responsibilities. They are also beholden to the
adviser—and, therefore, are not truly independent of it—particularly if they
wish to have a board position with investment companies the adviser may
form and manage in the future. This dynamic may be discerned in a
number of contexts, foremost among which is the process by which
advisory fees are established. In particular, a recurring argument has been
that the fees advisers charge the investment companies they manage are, in
some cases, excessive relative to the services provided and, therefore,
harmful to shareholders.84 To the extent that fee rates are too high, it is not
difficult to discern how the board’s relationship to the adviser may be
responsible. After all, the board is the counterparty in the fee negotiations,
acting on the investment company’s (and, indirectly, the shareholders’)
behalf.85 However, the board-adviser relationship means that the directors
may be deemed interested in transactions the adviser proposes, including
that the investment company be subject to a particular fee rate.86 Therefore,
the directors may not act as strong fiduciaries in negotiating the adviser’s
fees.87 As described below, other contexts likewise suggest boards’
83. See Warburton, supra note 9, at 750 (“Because the adviser is a legally distinct entity from the
fund and must seek higher profits for its owners, it has objectives that differ from those of mutual fund
investors . . . .”).
84. Although investment company shareholders have, on occasion, pursued this argument (under
§ 36(b) of the ICA), “there has not been a single adjudication of excessive fees since [§ 36(b)’s]
enactment.” James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral
Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907, 923 (2005).
85. Coates & Hubbard, supra note 65, at 158 (“The fees that an adviser charges a fund for the
adviser’s services require approval by the fund’s board of directors . . . .”); Johnson, supra note 10, at
504 (noting that an investment company’s board of directors negotiates and approves the contract with
the investment company’s adviser).
86. See Coates & Hubbard, supra note 65, at 158 (observing that an investment company’s
adviser appoints the fund’s initial board of directors and that, according to critics of the investment
company industry, advisers “control the fee approval process”).
87. See William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the
Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1423–26 (2006); Johnson, supra note 10, at 530–31. Of
course, this circumstance might not be particularly problematic if investment companies were subject to
market discipline, which might be imposed through shareholder activism (as one might expect in the
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conflict-based deficiencies, both in preventing harm to shareholders and in
encouraging activities beneficial to them.
1. Shareholders as Arbitrageurs
One example in recent years has been shareholder arbitrage practices,
in which hedge funds and other institutional investors have transacted in
investment company shares in order to take advantage of information that
becomes known to the market but that is not reflected in the price of the
shares.88 One of the practices has involved buying shares at the day’s
closing valuation for those shares, which is determined at 4:00 p.m. each
day, when information that would increase the price of those shares has
become available after 4:00 p.m. (so-called late-trading arbitrage).89
Having bought the shares at a price determined prior to the time the
market-moving information became available, the arbitrageur can sell them
the next day (or some other later point) at a price that has come to reflect
the new information.90 Another arbitrage practice has involved buying
shares of an investment company whose strategy revolves around trading in
international stocks during a day in which U.S. stock prices have
increased.91 In that circumstance, the arbitrageur’s expectation is that the
prices of the international stocks will also increase once international
markets resume trading, with the result that the investment company’s
share prices will increase as well the next day (so-called pricing
arbitrage).92
Arbitrage activity increased rather significantly about a decade ago,
likely a product of a number of factors, including heightened competition
operating company context) or redemptions. However, there are dramatically divergent analyses and
conclusions as to whether market forces effectively monitor or counter the fee rates that investment
advisers charge the investment companies they manage. Although some scholars have contended that,
yes, market discipline thrives in the investment company context, others have concluded that
competitive forces do not serve a disciplining function. See Coates & Hubbard, supra note 65, at 153–
54 (yes); Johnson, supra note 10, at 506 (no). Still others have concluded that the evidence points in
both directions. See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and
Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 111–12 (2010).
88. See William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded Funds: A Positive
Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 69, 100–03 (2008).
89. Mercer E. Bullard, The Mutual Fund as a Firm: Frequent Trading, Fund Arbitrage and the
SEC’s Response to the Mutual Fund Scandal, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1271, 1279–84 (2006).
90. Id. at 1279–80.
91. Id.. at 1285–90.
92. Id. In other words, in the latter instance, the arbitrageurs are able to buy investment company
shares valued on stock prices that, in light of the activity in the U.S. markets, have become “stale,” with
the objective of selling those shares once the valuation reflects the (delayed) increase in the value of the
international stocks in which the investment company has invested. Id.
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among investment companies (which may lead investment companies to
welcome even short-term, arbitrage-related investments), an increasing
number of ready and willing arbitrageurs (such as hedge funds), and ever
more volatile securities markets, particularly in the wake of the dot-com
crash.93 That increased activity brought more intense regulatory scrutiny,
including a number of SEC enforcement actions against investment
companies or their advisers.94 Thus blossomed the market-timing scandal, a
relatively well-trod topic in the academic literature on investment
companies.95 Lest there be any question about what, exactly, was the
scandalous aspect of arbitrage, it was this: arbitrage results in the unfair
dilution of the investment company’s longer-term shareholders, who must
share gains from increases in the value of the company’s investment
portfolio with arbitrageurs who bought shares with the knowledge that the
shares’ price was likely to increase.96 In other words, arbitrageurs unfairly
take value away from the investment company’s more stable base of
shareholders.97
93. Id. at 1288–90.
94. See William A. Birdthistle, Investment Indiscipline: A Behavioral Approach to Mutual Fund
Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 65 (“In 2003, state and federal regulators unleashed scores of
investigations of investment advisors whom they accused of mismanaging clients’ funds.”).
95. See generally, e.g., Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund
Scandals, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1021 (2007) (examining investor response to mutual fund scandals from
1999–2004); Jeff Schwartz, Mutual Fund Conflicts of Interest in the Wake of the Short-Term Trading
Scandals: Encouraging Structural Change Through Shareholder Choice, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 91
(2005) (arguing that market-timing scandals are evidence that the mutual fund industry is in need of
reform).
96. See Coffee, supra note 66, at 47 (noting that the “extraordinary rate of return” earned by
arbitrageurs “comes at the expense of long-term mutual fund holders” whose gains “are diluted because
they must be shared with . . . arbitrageurs” and whose mutual funds “must maintain an artificially high
cash level . . . to handle the [arbitrageurs’] predictable redemptions”); Bullard, supra note 89, at 1280,
1286; Mercer E. Bullard, Insider Trading in Mutual Funds, 84 OR. L. REV. 821, 828–31 (2005)
[hereinafter Insider Trading]; Markham, supra note 16, at 89.
97. Arbitrageurs are able to realize gains from portfolio stock price increases that they expect to
occur “after hours” (as is the case with pricing arbitrage) or that have already occurred but that are not
yet reflected in the investment company’s shares (as is the case with late-trading arbitrage) because of
the once-a-day pricing mechanism. See Bullard, Insider Trading, supra note 96, at 827 n.28. When
investment company shareholders buy or redeem their shares, they do so at the price per share
determined for the day on which the transaction occurs. See id. at 826–28. That price is equal to the fair
market value of the investment company’s net assets determined for that day, divided by the number of
outstanding shares. See Morley & Curtis, supra note 87, at 102–03. The price, therefore, does not take
into consideration any expectations as to whether the value of those assets will increase or decrease
going forward, based on all available information. See id. at 103–05. The significance of that
circumstance is more apparent when one compares it to the mechanism by which a shareholder of a
publicly traded operating company is able to buy or dispose of shares. Such a shareholder generally
may buy or sell shares only through transactions in the open market, and the price will reflect the
market’s expectations about the company’s future performance, which may fluctuate continuously.
Accordingly, whereas the investment company pricing mechanism raises the prospect of transactions at
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For present purposes, the interesting aspect of arbitrage activity lies in
the board’s role in permitting it. In at least some instances, would-be
arbitrageurs sought permission for their arbitrage practices from the
targeted investment companies (and their investment advisers).98 Yet
boards’ evaluations of arbitrage practices, quite possibly already numbed
by insufficient industry expertise, may have been muted still further by the
board-adviser relationship. Specifically, even were we to assume that a
board considering such a proposal would undertake an independent
evaluation of it, it was plausible that the board would not have discerned a
problem with the proposed arrangement—at least not unless one of the
board members “understood what this new form of market timing entailed,
why it worked, what the dynamics of the daily pricing of fund shares
were,” and the “fundamental genesis” of the SEC’s rule that prohibits an
investor’s buying shares “at an older, lower, and obviously stale price.”99
As suggested above, however, the prospect that directors did not have that
degree of understanding is at least a reasonable one.100 To be sure,
independent directors of operating companies may be similarly limited in
their firm-specific expertise.101 The problem is exacerbated in the
investment company context, however, precisely because there is reason to
question the hypothetical assumption above regarding the board’s
undertaking an independent evaluation. That, again, is a product of an
adviser-board relationship that perversely incentivizes boards to defer to
the investment adviser in acting on matters before them.102
“stale” prices, the operating company pricing mechanism does not. See id.
98. Advisers were prone to countenance arbitrage arrangements, despite the possible
administrative costs they might impose on the relevant investment company, if, for example, the
arbitrageur agreed to invest significant long-term capital in the investment company, which would
benefit the adviser through the fees payable on those long-term assets. See Birdthistle, supra note 94, at
76 (“[S]everal investment advisors—in contravention of their statements expressly prohibiting market
timing in their own prospectuses—countenanced such trading by institutional investors” on the basis
that, “as a quid pro quo for market timing one mutual fund, the institutional investors would typically
park ‘sticky assets’ in a related but separate mutual fund”).
99. Bancroft, supra note 78, at 147–48 (“[F]amiliarity with the mechanics of mutual fund share
pricing and the policies underlying Rule 22c-1, as well as with the new market-timing strategy afoot,
would have been essential to understanding the issues . . . .”).
100. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
101. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for
Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 874–75 (1991) (“[O]utside directors lack the time,
expertise, staff, and information to challenge management . . . .”).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 39–46 & 65–68.
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2. Investment Company (In)Activism
A second example of investment companies’ conflict-based
deficiencies may be discerned in their relative “inactivism” as shareholders
of companies in their portfolios. Beyond taking positions on corporate
questions through voting proxies, investment companies, like any portfolio
company shareholder, may have the desire or inclination to pursue
incremental governance changes through more aggressive modes of
corporate involvement, such as through seeking to influence particular
decisions of portfolio company boards of directors, proposing proxy
initiatives or alternative slates of board candidates, or coordinating with
other shareholders on voting decisions—and possibly acquiring large
blocks of stock in order to pursue those ends better.103 Indeed, investment
companies are better suited to assume activist shareholder roles than are
smaller, more dispersed shareholders.104 Among other things, they have
greater resources to deploy toward challenging corporate management and,
importantly, they (meaning the investment advisers managing them) have
more expertise in evaluating companies and management as compared with
their smaller, and arguably less sophisticated, counterparts.105
To be sure, it is an open question as to whether investment companies’
assuming a more activist role vis-à-vis corporate management is
normatively desirable. As one might expect, there is disagreement on that
point. For one thing, it may be that the balance between managerial
authority and accountability that the present corporate-structural regime has
achieved is appropriate and best furthers investors’ interests.106 If that is the
case, then there is little need for the additional monitoring that activist
investment companies might bring to the table. Second, even if the
accountability / authority balance is not presently optimal, with managers’
discretion insufficiently constrained by their obligations to shareholders, it
may be that investment companies are not the best candidates for filling the
monitoring void.107 That might be so, for example, either if the shareholder
activism that investment companies pursue serves only the investment
companies’ interests without also furthering the interests of the investment
companies’ fellow shareholders or, perhaps worse, if the activism serves
103. See Robert C. Illig, The Promise of Hedge Fund Governance: How Incentive Compensation
Can Enhance Institutional Investor Monitoring, 60 ALA. L. REV. 41, 48–49 (2008).
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 53 (“[M]any conservative legal scholars are fairly sanguine about the current state
of corporate accountability and so oppose any efforts to reform America’s governance system.”).
107. Id. at 54.
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only the interests of the investment advisers managing the activist
investment companies without also furthering the interests of the
investment companies’ shareholders.108
The important point in all of this, however, is that, regardless of the
potential for or desirability of investment companies’ greater shareholder
activism, investment companies have in fact not been particularly activist
shareholders, especially when compared with their private equity and
hedge fund counterparts.109 Rather, investment companies have tended to
express their dissatisfaction with corporate management by simply selling
their shares and moving on,110 forgoing action that potentially could benefit
not only their own shareholders but also fellow portfolio company
shareholders. One plausible reason for investment companies’ inactivism is
that investment companies have no particular incentive to be activist—or,
more accurately, their investment advisers have no particular incentive to
cause them to be activist.
From the investment adviser’s perspective, the most that activism can
achieve is to increase the investment company’s net asset value and,
therefore, the incremental fee payable to the adviser.111 That is, unlike
advisers to private equity funds, for example, the adviser is not itself
entitled to a portion of the profit an investment company earns as a result of
its activism.112 That incremental increase in assets presumably does not
give the adviser sufficient incentive for activism, both because the same
increase could be achieved, at lower expense and with less risk, by causing
the investment company to seek out investments in other portfolio
companies and because performance may not play a significant role in
attracting new shareholders.113 However, if, in fact, a more activist
investment approach could have substantial effects on a portfolio
company’s performance, thereby benefitting the investment company’s
current shareholders (even if only incrementally), one might reason that the
investment company board of directors is aptly positioned to step in to
108. See id. (noting that one concern about activism by institutional investors is that those
investors “would cause corporations to pursue policies that would be detrimental to investors whose
time horizons, risk tolerances, and political goals differ”).
109. See id. at 42.
110. See id. (noting that “most institutional investors [have] remained largely passive in their
investment outlook” and that, when a portfolio company fails to perform, they “typically exit the
investment rather than seek to translate their influence into better performance”).
111. Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap for
Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 231–32 (2007).
112. Id. at 231.
113. See id. at 322–30.
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evaluate pursuing that approach. Although further exploration of this
prospect is warranted, the conclusion may well be that the board’s voice is
not, and cannot be, an effective, independent check on the adviser’s.114
IV. COURTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NORMS
As Part III suggests, directors’ and advisers’ interests are conflicted.
On one hand, advisers are fiduciaries to the investment company; on the
other hand, they operate businesses apart from the investment company and
have fiduciary duties to other advisory clients.115 On one hand, boards are
fiduciaries to the investment company; on the other hand, they are
incentivized to accede to the investment adviser’s wishes, whether that be
to allow a favored investment company shareholder to trade the company’s
shares more frequently than other shareholders or to eschew activist
activities that may redound to the benefit of the company’s portfolio.116
These conflicts of interest, however, constitute only one way in which the
corporate governance paradigm militates against securities regulatory
objectives. As this part elaborates, the corporate governance paradigm
produces additional adverse consequences by virtue of authorizing, if not
encouraging, courts to apply corporate law principles that arguably are
inconsistent with those objectives. This may occur in two contexts: First, in
evaluating shareholder claims involving corporate governance questions,
courts afford excessive deference to answers supplied by state corporate
law.117 Second, in evaluating shareholder claims of securities fraud or other
securities regulatory matters, courts deploy an entity-centric analysis
deriving from corporate governance norms, ignoring that investment
114. Of course, to the extent that investment advisers are driven by particular incentives, one
might assume that investment company boards of directors could be similarly motivated. Boards of
directors of operating companies, for example, may be incentivized to play a strong fiduciary role
toward the company and its shareholders to the extent they receive stock or stock options or other forms
of compensation that are tied to the company’s performance over time. Troy A. Paredes, A Systems
Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1085 (2004) (“[S]tock options, restricted stock, and other forms of
incentive-based compensation . . . encourage directors and officers to maximize corporate profits.”).
Directors owning stock options should have incentives to prevent or at least question actions by
executives and other personnel that seem adverse to shareholder interests, to make major board-level
decisions in a manner that increases value, and to implement oversight procedures designed to give
them an accurate picture of the company’s compliance with applicable laws and regulations. See id. In
the investment company context, however, directors’ compensation necessarily consists primarily of
cash. See infra text accompanying notes 174–76.
115. See supra Part III.A.
116. See supra Part III.B.
117. See infra Part IV.A.
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companies are effectively super-entity enterprises.118
A. COURTS’ DEFERENCE TO CORPORATE LAW
Exacerbating the effects of investment adviser domination of
investment company boards is the judiciary’s apparent eagerness to refer to
state corporate law to determine shareholder rights in the absence of
express ICA rules.119 Two prominent examples come to mind: First, the
standards courts apply in determining the reasonableness of fees charged
by investment advisers derive from state corporate law principles.120
Second, in shareholder derivative lawsuits, courts have deferred to state
corporate law to determine the threshold question of whether plaintiffs
should be required to make demands on boards of directors before
proceeding with the litigation.121 As this section describes, in both of these
circumstances, courts’ decisions have been based on the corporate
governance foundation of investment company regulation rather than—as
should have been the case—that regulation’s investor protection
objectives.122
1. Evaluating Advisory Fees
In Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P., the Supreme Court evaluated the
standard by which courts should evaluate whether an investment adviser
breached its “fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for
services,” which § 36(b) of the ICA imposes on investment advisers.123
Section 36(b) is a relatively new provision of the ICA, which Congress
adopted in 1970 to bolster the Act’s protection of shareholders.124 In Jones,
investment company shareholders claimed that the fees charged by the
investment adviser were too high, in that they were “disproportionate to the
services rendered.”125 At issue for the Court was whether the test for
118. See infra Part IV.B.
119. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 1026–27 (noting that the Supreme Court looks “to state law
where the matter is not specifically addressed in the [ICA]” because “there is no federal common law of
corporations for mutual funds”).
120. See infra Part IV.A.1.
121. See infra Part IV.A.2.
122. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108–09 (1991) (holding that federal
courts should apply state law governing the authority of independent directors); Burks v. Lasker, 441
U.S. 471, 486 (1979) (same).
123. Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 (2010) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
124. See id. (explaining that the 1970 amendments also required that not more than 60 percent of
an investment company’s directors be affiliated with the company’s investment adviser).
125. Id. at 1424.
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evaluating investment company fees developed by the Second Circuit
twenty-five years ago was the appropriate one.126 Under that test—dubbed
the Gartenberg standard—an investment adviser breaches its § 36(b)
obligations by “charg[ing] a fee that is so disproportionately large that it
bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not
have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.”127 Applying that
standard, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois had granted
summary judgment to the adviser.128 Although the Seventh Circuit
affirmed, it did so by rejecting Gartenberg and formulating a new test
based on fiduciary principles under trust law.129 Under the Seventh
Circuit’s test, provided an adviser has made full disclosure to the board and
otherwise has “play[ed] no tricks,” the amount an adviser charges is
relevant only if it is “so unusual as to give rise to an inference that deceit
must have occurred, or that the persons responsible for [the] decision have
abdicated.”130
Justice Alito began the Court’s analysis with the history of § 36(b),
observing that its fiduciary standard reflected “a delicate compromise.”131
In particular, prior to Congress’s adoption of § 36(b) in 1970, a challenge
under state law to the fees charged by an investment adviser needed to meet
“common-law standards of corporate waste, under which an unreasonable
or unfair fee might be approved unless the court deemed it unconscionable
or shocking.”132 Moreover, such a challenge brought under the ICA could
succeed only with a showing of “gross abuse of trust.”133 In an effort to
provide shareholders with greater recourse, Congress considered a
provision empowering the SEC to challenge fees that it deemed
unreasonable.134 After investment company industry representatives
expressed concerns that such an approach would effectively give the SEC
“ratemaking authority,” Congress adopted a fiduciary standard as a
compromise approach.135 The Jones Court, acknowledging that § 36(b)’s
126. Id. at 1425–26 (citing Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928–30
(2d Cir. 1982)).
127. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d., at 928 (citation omitted).
128. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1424.
129. See id.
130. Id. (quoting Jones v. Harris Assoc., L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (2008)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
131. Id. at 1423.
132. Id. (quoting Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 540 n.12 (1984)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
133. Id. (quoting Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 538).
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 538).
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reference to advisers’ fiduciary duties regarding fees was “hardly pellucid,”
nonetheless concluded that Gartenberg correctly articulates what § 36(b)
requires.136
The Court reasoned that the Gartenberg standard “reflects §
36(b)’s . . . relationship to the other protections that the [Investment
Company] Act affords investors”—particularly the protections provided by
the board of directors:137
Under the Act, scrutiny of investment adviser compensation by a fully
informed mutual fund board is the “cornerstone of the . . . effort to
control conflicts of interest within mutual funds.” The Act interposes
disinterested directors as “independent watchdogs” of the relationship
between a mutual fund and its adviser. . . .
In recognition of the role of the disinterested directors, the Act instructs
courts to give board approval of an adviser’s compensation “such
consideration . . . as is deemed appropriate under all the
circumstances.”138

Based on this formulation, the Court concluded both that the
“appropriate measure of deference [to a board’s judgment] varies
depending on the circumstances” and that the Gartenberg standard “heeds
these precepts.”139 For example, under Gartenberg, “where the board’s
process was deficient or the adviser withheld important information, the
court must take a more rigorous look” at the amount of the fee.140 With
that, the Court seemed to suggest more rigorous scrutiny of advisory fees
than what is implied by the Seventh Circuit’s “full disclosure” approach.
Yet, in explicating the Gartenberg standard, the Court came
precariously close to endorsing the Seventh Circuit’s approach, at least in
substance. Specifically, recalling Congress’s rejection of a
“reasonableness” requirement, the Court noted that the § 36(b) standard for
fiduciary breach “does not call for judicial second-guessing of informed
136. Id. at 1426.
137. Id. at 1427.
138. Id. at 1427–28 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 482 (1979)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
139. Id. at 1428. (“Gartenberg advises that ‘the expertise of the independent trustees of a fund,
whether they are fully informed about all facts bearing on the [investment adviser’s] service and fee,
and the extent of care and conscientiousness with which they perform their duties are important facts to
be considered in deciding whether they and the [investment adviser] are guilty of a breach of fiduciary
duty in violation of § 36(b).’”) (quoting Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923,
930 (2d Cir. 1982)).
140. Id. at 1430.
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board decisions.”141 Accordingly, although boards’ conflicting interests
may “justify some restraints” on directors’ unfettered discretion in
negotiating an adviser’s fees, those conflicts “do not suggest that a court
may supplant the judgment of disinterested directors apprised of all
relevant information, without additional evidence that the fee exceeds the
arm’s-length range.”142 Therein lies the difficulty, however: the
relationship between advisers and boards means that there necessarily is no
way to determine what fee levels fall within arm’s-length range—
particularly because the Court did not provide any guidance on that point,
other than to confirm that courts need to consider “all relevant factors.”143
It is difficult to discern, then, how courts might ever conclude that an
adviser has breached its fiduciary duties with respect to fees, so long as the
board’s process in reviewing the fee was not “deficient,”144 however that
might be defined. Indeed, the deference suggested by this analysis seems
strikingly similar to the (substantial) deference bestowed on boards by the
business judgment rule under state corporate law norms.145
2. Derivative Shareholder Litigation
A second prominent example of courts’ deference to state corporate
governance norms arises in the context of more general shareholder claims
of breach of fiduciary duty. More particularly, there has arisen the question
of whether those claims should be brought as derivative claims on behalf of
the investment company rather than as direct claims of shareholders. Under
state corporate law, such claims generally are brought derivatively on the
basis that the harm alleged is to the company.146 Accordingly, the company
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing Burks, 441 U.S. at 481)
143. See id. at 1428 (citing § 80a-35(b)(2) (2006)). The Court expressly rejected suggestions that
comparisons to the fees an adviser charges other funds or clients or fees charged to investment
companies by other advisers are probative on the “arm’s-length” question. Id. at 1429. Indeed, it
pointed out that “[e]ven if the services provided and fees charged to an independent fund are relevant,
courts should be mindful that the [ICA] does not necessarily ensure fee parity between mutual funds
and institutional clients.” Id. at 1429. By the same token, the Court thought that comparing fees charged
other investment companies is “problematic because these fees . . . may not be the product of
negotiations conducted at arm’s-length.” Id.
144. Id. at 1430.
145. At the least, the Court appeared strikingly unconcerned with the conflicts of interest that
inhere in board-adviser relationships—conflicts that, in the operating company context, would arguably
suggest duty of loyalty concerns and remove the analysis from the umbrella of the business judgment
presumption. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (“When directors of a
Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to demonstrate their utmost
good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.”).
146. O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 50, at 398 (identifying a derivative claim as “an action
on behalf of the corporation for harm to it”) (quoting Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982)).
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has the cause of action, rather than its shareholders.147
The distinction between direct and derivative litigation is important
because of the so-called “demand” requirement. In some states, if a claim is
derivative in nature, shareholders are able to pursue it on the company’s
behalf only if they first requested that the board of directors pursue the
claim, and the board refused to do so.148 This is a “universal demand”
requirement, which, as its name suggests, requires that all would-be
plaintiffs ask the board to proceed with the lawsuit before they are able to
move forward derivatively.149 In other states, including Delaware,
shareholders generally are required to make demand on the board but are
excused from doing so in circumstances of demand futility—that is, where
shareholders allege with particularity that the board lacks the independence
or disinterestedness necessary to objectively consider the demand.150 The
prospect of demand futility means that demand has become a threshold
query in most derivative lawsuits, one that often halts shareholder litigation
in deference to the board’s managerial role.151
So it is in the investment company context as well. Courts considering
claims by investment company shareholders have generally determined
(based on state corporate law principles) that those claims are derivative,
rather than direct, on the basis that the harm arising from a breach is harm
to the investment company rather than to its shareholders.152 Moreover, in a
1979 case, Burks v. Lasker, the Supreme Court determined that, in
evaluating derivative claims brought by investment company shareholders,
courts should, in conducting demand analysis, defer to the corporate law of
the state in which the investment company was incorporated.153 In reaching
147. See id.
148. See id. at 399.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Scalisi v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 380 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting
Werbowsky v. Collomb, 766 A.2d 123, 144 (Md. 2001) (explaining that under Maryland’s statute,
demand will be deemed futile only if the plaintiffs’ allegations clearly demonstrate that making demand
would cause irreparable harm to the corporation or that “a majority of the directors are so personally
and directly conflicted or committed to the decision in dispute that they cannot reasonably be expected
to respond to a demand in good faith and within the ambit of the business judgment rule”).
151. See Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation:
The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1362–65 (1993) (“The plaintiff must overcome the
business judgment rule’s presumption that management acted properly in rejecting the shareholder
demand.”).
152. Langevoort, supra note 8, at 1025–26 (“By and large, courts have found most claims of
breach of fiduciary duty under the [ICA] to be ones where the harm is to the fund rather than
shareholders and hence must be brought derivatively, which is consistent with corporate law as
generally understood.”).
153. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 777–78 (1979). See also Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc.
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its conclusion, the Burks Court focused on the ICA’s role in investment
companies’ operations: “Since the ICA does not purport to be the source of
authority for managerial power but instead functions primarily to impose
controls and restrictions on the internal management of investment
companies, the ICA . . . do[es] not require that federal law displace state
laws governing the powers of directors . . . .”154 Despite recognizing the
role of state corporate law in investment company governance, however,
the Burks Court also recognized that state corporate law should not be
deployed to thwart the ICA’s regulatory objectives.155 Accordingly, it
articulated an important caveat—namely, that state corporate law should
not be applied to the extent it permits actions that the ICA prohibits or if
“[its] application would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying
the cause of action.”156 Indeed, according to the Court, “federal courts must
be ever vigilant to insure that application of state law poses no significant
threat to any identifiable federal policy or interest.”157
Barring the courts’ ability or willingness to create federal common
law on the point,158 the Burks caveat seems necessary, given that “so much
of the [ICA] rests on a repudiation of the traditional protections of state
corporate law.”159 That might seem particularly the case in light of the
special circumstances of directors’ service on investment company boards
of directors. An investment company’s adviser typically manages more
than that one investment company and, indeed, usually manages a number
of investment companies—a “complex” or a “family” of funds, in the
jargon of the industry.160 And, typically, the investment adviser will
appoint the same persons as board members for many, if not all, of the
investment companies that the adviser manages.161 In the parlance of the
industry, a board serving in that capacity for multiple, related investment
companies is a “unitary” board.162 As one might expect, to the extent
500 U.S. 90, 90 (1991) (“A court entertaining a derivative action under the ICA must apply the demand
futility exception as it is defined by the law of the State of incorporation.”).
154. Burks, 441 U.S. at 471–72.
155. See id. at 479.
156. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975)).
157. Id. (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
158. Id. at 477 (noting that, although “in certain areas we have held that federal statutes authorize
the federal courts to fashion a complete body of federal law,” corporate law “is not such an area”).
159. Langevoort, supra note 8, at 1027.
160. See Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 130 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Like most advisors Calamos
Advisors runs multiple funds . . . .”).
161. See id. (noting that the adviser “uses the same six-member board of trustees, five of whom
are ‘independent’ within the meaning of the [ICA], to oversee all the funds”).
162. Id.
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shareholders’ claims are against the investment adviser, the adviser’s role
in selecting board members may create conflicts for board members in
evaluating the shareholders’ demand. After all, if a board member desires
to continue to serve as such for other investment companies managed—and
to be managed in the future—by the investment adviser, the board member
arguably may be reluctant to support bringing a lawsuit against the
investment adviser.163 Yet this special circumstance is not one that courts
have countenanced as permitting a conclusion that demand was futile.164
Indeed, any chastening effect that the ICA, combined with Burks, may
have had on courts’ analyses of shareholder derivative claims has been
minimal (at best). Rarely has a court evaluating whether shareholderplaintiffs should have made demand on the board of directors determined
that demand was futile,165 and only rarely have courts so much as
mentioned the Burks caveat.166 Accordingly, dogged application of
corporate governance norms has effectively meant that shareholders will
encounter substantial difficulty showing that directors were sufficiently
interested as to be unable to evaluate a demand. That means that investment
company shareholders stand on more or less the same ground as operating
company shareholders in terms of their ability to pursue fiduciary duty
claims on behalf of the company. Yet, if investment company regulation
exists because state corporate governance norms, by themselves, are
insufficiently protective of investors, then, at the least, courts should pause
before reverting to those norms when doing so accomplishes nothing more
than impeding shareholders’ ability to enforce the ICA’s protections.
163. See, e.g., Alexander v. Allianz Dresdner Asset Mgmt. of Am. Holding, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d
190, 196–97 (D. Conn. 2007) (“The plaintiffs allege that the trustees are interested because each of the
trustees was appointed by the Investment Adviser Defendants and is therefore ‘beholden to the
Investment Adviser Defendants for his or her position and substantial compensation as a Director.’”).
164. See, e.g., Seidl v. Am. Century Cos., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 249, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d,
427 Fed. Appx. 35 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[W]here, as here a derivative suit brought on behalf of one fund
might have some adverse impact on other funds managed by the same investment adviser and overseen
by the same board of directors, it cannot be held that, as a matter of law, directors are so personally
conflicted that they could not consider a demand in good faith and within the ambit of the business
judgment rule.”); Alexander, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (“[S]ervice on multiple boards is common practice
and not a basis for finding a trustee ‘interested.’”).
165. See, e.g., Scalisi v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 380 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Werbowsky
sets forth . . . Maryland’s standards for determining whether demand on a corporation’s directors is
excused. We see no reason to believe that Maryland would depart from those standards in the case of a
registered investment company.”); Seidl, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 258 n.12 (noting the absence of authority to
support the plaintiff’s suggestion that “a more lenient standard for proving demand futility should apply
to the directors of mutual funds”).
166. See Strougo v. Bassini, 282 F.3d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 2001) (“We must fill a gap in the ICA
with rules borrowed from state law unless . . . application of those rules would frustrate the specific
federal policy objectives underlying the ICA.”).
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Additional concerns have arisen from the courts’ demand analysis.
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit, in evaluating a failure of complaining
shareholders to make a demand on the board, has gone so far as to suggest
that the fiduciary duties boards of directors owe investment companies are
less robust than those boards owe to operating companies. Under Judge
Posner’s reasoning, directors of any one investment company must be
mindful of their (possibly) competing obligations to other investment
companies in the same family—including investment companies that do
not yet exist:167
[A] unitary board [is] responsible to the entire family of funds, including
future funds because the present value of an enterprise is the discounted
value of its future earnings. This responsibility may require the board to
make tradeoffs to the disadvantage of investors in one of the funds for
the sake of the welfare of the family a whole. 168

With that, Judge Posner suggests that any particular investment
company, in fact, is not really an enterprise unto itself but, rather, is but a
piece of a larger enterprise that must be considered in its totality. As
discussed below, that analysis, on its own, is compelling.169 However,
when deployed for the purposes of heightening standards shareholders must
meet to move forward with their claims, it militates against the federal
policy motivating the ICA—and turns the Burks caveat on its head. The
upshot is that if courts should consider the ICA’s policy objectives in
applying state corporate law, it is difficult to discern that that is actually
happening. This is not to say that allegations of conflicts based on a unitary
board structure should always or in any particular case be deemed
sufficient to allow plaintiffs to proceed with their claims. However, courts’
failure to evaluate the concern with more than a passing reference to strict
standards mandated by the applicable state law at least suggests an
additional weakness in the investment company regulatory regime. It is,
moreover, another weakness that derives from the intrusion of the corporate
governance paradigm in securities regulatory objectives.
Judge Posner’s conclusion that an investment company “enterprise”
includes all of the investment companies, present or future, within the same
family suggests doctrinal avenues that are more protective of shareholders,
provided we put aside the corporate governance paradigm. In particular, if
we move beyond the entity focus of that paradigm, we should be able to
move beyond the notion that shareholder lawsuits to enforce fiduciary
167.
168.
169.

Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 130 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. (citations omitted)
See infra text accompanying notes 171–78.
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duties need ever be derivative in nature. Indeed, some plaintiffshareholders have raised this prospect, arguing that the court should regard
their claims as direct because investment companies are “mere shell[s].”170
Because the net asset value of investment company shares, unlike that of
operating company shares, is calculated on a daily basis,171 the argument
goes, “any increase or decrease in fund assets is immediately passed on
directly to the fund investors.”172 Courts have swiftly rejected such
arguments on the basis that they do not, in fact, demonstrate a distinction
between investment companies and operating companies. For example, one
such court, acknowledging that increases and decreases in an investment
company’s net assets “may be calculated on a nearly continuous basis as
the per share net asset value,” nonetheless concluded that “such a
calculation is no different than the fluctuating daily prices of shares held by
stockholders of publicly traded corporations” and, in any event, assets of
either type of company are those of the company until distributed to
shareholders.173
Not surprisingly, when the corporate governance paradigm is at play,
arguments supporting direct shareholder claims have little purchase.
However, if the analysis is not confined by its entity-centric perspective, it
becomes evident that investment companies are different in kind from
operating companies, for the reasons that the plaintiffs noted above have
suggested. That is a combination of the three characteristics of investment
companies on which their argument relies. First, an investment company’s
shares are valued on a daily basis based solely on the value of the securities
the investment company holds—rather than the prospects for future
appreciation in those shares.174 Second, shareholders may redeem their
170. See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir. 1977) (“A mutual fund is a ‘mere
shell,’ a pool of assets consisting mostly of portfolio securities that belongs to the individual investors
holding shares in a fund.”).
171. See Stegall v. Ladner, 394 F. Supp. 2d 358, 365–66 (D. Mass. 2005). To determine an
investment company’s “per share net asset value” on any particular day, the company’s liabilities
(which largely are fees payable to the investment adviser) are subtracted from the market value of the
company’s portfolio securities (plus any other assets the company holds), and the result is divided by
the number of shares outstanding. Id.
172. Everett v. Bozic, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55824, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2006) (emphasis
omitted). See also Stegall, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 365 (reciting plaintiff-shareholders’ argument that injury
caused by an investment adviser’s breach of fiduciary duty “flows by its nature directly to
shareholders”); Strigliabotti v. Franklin Resources, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9625, at *25 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 7, 2005) (“[T]he financial harm from overcharges is harm to the individual investors, who own the
Funds’ assets and bear its expenses directly . . . .”).
173. Everett, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *13. Accord Stegall, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 366.
174. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.

2013]

INVESTMENT COMPANY AS INSTRUMENT

299

shares at any time at the current daily net asset value.175 Finally, investment
companies’ assets comprise simply the aggregate capital contributed by
their shareholders (as that capital, invested in securities, may appreciate or
depreciate), meaning that no portion of an investment company’s assets is
attributable to equipment, inventory, intellectual property, or any other
assets that often appear on operating companies’ balance sheets.176 Those
three characteristics render investment companies “transparent” in the
sense that, but for the interposition of the entity that is the investment
company, there is nothing about an investment company that is additive to
what shareholders seek from it—namely, investment of their capital by an
adviser they have selected. Derivative litigation principles of corporate law
and the entity-centric focus of corporate governance are based on the
notion that the entity’s interests are not necessarily coextensive with those
of its owners. That is a considerably more difficult case to make in the case
of investment companies, and, therefore, there is a much stronger case for
allowing direct claims by investment company shareholders.
B. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SECURITIES FRAUD
The entity centrism of the corporate governance paradigm may be
discerned also in the 2011 Supreme Court decision, Janus Capital Group,
Inc. v. First Derivative Traders.177 The facts in Janus are relatively
straightforward: shareholders of Janus Capital Group, Inc. (“JCG”) filed a
class action against the firm, alleging that Janus Capital Management, LLC
(“JCM”), a wholly owned subsidiary of JCG, violated § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 under that Act in
connection with statements made in the prospectus of an investment
company managed by JCM, Janus Investment Fund (“Janus Fund”).178 The
relationship among these Janus entities was typical of investment company
complexes. In particular, JCG, a publicly traded firm, created the Janus
Fund (as well as other investment companies), which engaged JCM as its
investment adviser and administrator.179 Like any other investment
company, the Janus Fund was a legal entity separate from both JCG and
JCM—and, like any other investment company, its shareholders were
175. See Palmiter, supra note 66, at 1433 (“The dominant mutual fund form, the open-end fund,
must be able to redeem investors’ shares overnight on demand.”).
176. See Morley & Curtis, supra note 87, at 92 (“A mutual fund is a pool of investment securities
that . . . is composed almost entirely of debt or minority equity holdings in many companies.”).
177. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
178. Id. at 2299.
179. Id.
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investors who contributed capital for investment purposes.180 Moreover,
like any investment company, JCM, as the investment adviser, provided
investment-advisory services to the Fund, which included “the management
and . . . operation of Janus Fund.”181
In its action under Rule 10b-5, which forbids “any person . . . [t]o
make any untrue statement of a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities,”182 First Derivative Traders (“First
Derivative”), representing the plaintiff class, alleged that JCG and JCM
made false statements in the Janus Fund prospectus by virtue of
representations that the Fund “w[as] not suitable for market timing.”183
First Derivative further alleged that the allegedly false statements
ultimately adversely affected the price of its JCG stockholdings.184
Specifically, the New York attorney general had brought an action against
JCG and JCM alleging that JCG had “entered into secret arrangements to
permit market timing in several funds run by JCM.”185 When those
allegations became public, Janus Fund shareholders withdrew significant
amounts of capital from the Fund. As a result of the diminution in the Janus
Fund’s assets, JCM received substantially less compensation because that
compensation was based on the amount of Fund assets. Because the fee
compensation earned by JCM “comprised a significant percentage of JCG’s
income,” JCG’s stock price suffered a significant reduction in value.186
First Derivative argued that JCM and JCG should be liable for the
losses JCG shareholders suffered on the basis that JCG and JCM “caused
mutual fund prospectuses to be issued . . . and made them available to the
investing public, which created the misleading impression that JCG and
JCM would implement measures to curb market timing in the Janus
[Fund].”187 First Derivative asserted that, if the truth had been disclosed,
the Janus Fund “would have been less attractive to investors, and
consequently, JCG would have realized lower revenues,” with the result
that JCG’s shares would have traded at a commensurately lower price.188
At issue, then, was whether JCM, in light of its relationship to the Janus
Fund—which, again, was typical of adviser-investment company
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id. (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2301 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2300.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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relationships—could be deemed to have made statements disseminated by
and about the Janus Fund.189 The District Court for the District of
Maryland had dismissed the complaint on the basis that it failed to state a
claim on which relief could be granted.190 However, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that First Derivative “had sufficiently
alleged that ‘JCG and JCM, by participating in the writing and
dissemination of the prospectuses, made the misleading statements
contained in the documents.’”191
Determining that JCM did not “make” the material misstatements in
the Janus Fund prospectus, Justice Thomas, writing for the Supreme Court,
concluded that JCM could not be held liable for losses arising from those
misstatements.192 The rule on which the Court based its conclusion was that
“the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority
over the statement, including its content and whether and how to
communicate it.”193 According to the Court,
JCM did not “make” any of the statements in the Janus Investment Fund
prospectus; Janus Investment Fund did. Only Janus Investment Fund—
not JCM—bears the statutory obligation to file the prospectuses with the
SEC. The SEC has recorded that Janus Investment Fund filed the
prospectuses. There is no allegation that JCM in fact filed the
prospectuses and falsely attributed them to Janus Investment Fund. Nor
did anything on the face of the prospectuses indicate that any statements
therein came from JCM rather than Janus Investment Fund—a legally
independent entity . . . .194

The First Derivative argument had emphasized the relationship
between JCM and the Janus Fund195 and the circumstance that investment
advisers play a—if not “the”—primary role in formulating the disclosure
189. See id. at 2301.
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting another source). The Fourth Circuit also found that JCG could be liable only as a
“control person” of JCM under § 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because, while JCG
shareholders would infer that JCM “played a role in preparing or approving the content of the Janus
fund prospectuses,” they would not infer the same about JCG. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting another
source). Accordingly, before the Supreme Court, First Derivative sought to hold JCG liable only as a
control person of JCM, while continuing to assert that JCM made the allegedly false statements. See id.
192. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the Court observed that it must be careful not to expand the
private right of action implied under § 10(b). Id. at 2301–02.
193. Id. at 2302.
194. Id. at 2304–05 (citations omitted).
195. In his dissent, Justice Breyer described that relationship in greater detail:
“[JCM] . . . manages the purchase, sale, redemption, and distribution of the [Janus] Fund’s investments.
[JCM] prepares, modifies, and implements the Janus Fund’s long-term strategies. And
[JCM] . . . carries out the Fund’s daily activities.” Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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made by the investment companies they manage, just as advisers control
most aspects of investment companies’ operations.196 The Court
paraphrased First Derivative’s argument as follows:
First Derivative suggests that the “well-recognized and uniquely close
relationship between a mutual fund and its investment adviser” should
inform our decision. It suggests that an investment adviser should
generally be understood to be the “maker” of statements by its client
mutual fund, like a playwright whose lines are delivered by an actor.197

First Derivative’s claim that JCM made statements in the Janus Fund’s
prospectus merely recognized that investment advisers and the investment
companies they manage are integral, if not inseparable, components of the
same enterprise: providing discretionary investment-advisory services to a
group of investors. However, retreating to the fact that “corporate
formalities were observed,” that JCM and the Janus Fund were “legally
separate entities,” and that the Janus Fund’s board “was more independent
than the statute requires,” the Court “decline[d] [First Derivative’s]
invitation to disregard the corporate form.”198
The Court foreshadowed its holding in its observation that the
relationship between an investment company and its adviser is similar to
the relationship between a speechwriter and a speaker. “Even when a
speechwriter drafts a speech,” Justice Thomas observed, “the content is
entirely within the control of the person who delivers it.”199 Like a
speechwriter, JCM may have helped the Janus Fund craft the content of the
prospectuses, but the Janus Fund was the speaker who actually made the
statements in the prospectuses.200 Or, put more generally, the investment
company is the independent, autonomous being making a statement on its
own behalf, even though it had assistance in determining what to say.
Characterized in this way, of course, the relationship of an investment
adviser to an investment company is effectively the inverse of a
playwright-actor relationship. Accordingly, whereas First Derivative
viewed the investment company (the speaker) as merely an agent acting on
behalf of and under the control of the investment adviser (the writer),
Justice Thomas viewed the investment company (the speaker) as a
principal whose investment adviser (the writer) acts on the investment
company’s behalf and under its control. Presumably Justice Thomas
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See id. at 2304.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2302.
Id. at 2305.
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preferred the speechwriter-speaker analogy over the playwright-actor
analogy because it supports corporate personhood and the distinction
between corporate beings. On the basis of that comparison, the Court was
able to characterize an adviser’s role in preparing a misleading prospectus
to that of aiding and abetting—activities that do not give rise to a private
right of action under Rule 10b-5.201
The Court’s holding in Janus derives from, and further supports, the
corporate governance paradigm, to the detriment of investor protection. In
his dissent, Justice Breyer highlighted the potential anomalies wrought by
the Court’s decision, describing a not implausible scenario in which “guilty
management [that is, the investment adviser] writes a prospectus (for the
board) containing materially false statements and fools both board and
public into believing they are true.”202 In light of the rule the majority
articulated, noted Justice Breyer, in those circumstances “no one could be
found to have ‘ma[d]e’ a materially false statement.”203 Indeed, that would
seem to be the potential consequence of the Court’s holding: the adviser
cannot be liable under Rule 10b-5 because it did not formally issue the
prospectus, and the investment company itself cannot be liable either
because the board deferred to the adviser, who—as the repository of the
investment company’s “outsourced” personnel—was the only party with
the requisite information about the matters to be disclosed in the
prospectus. In other words, the Court’s holding does not recognize that, in
the investment company context, the corporation “making” the statements
is not a freestanding entity unto itself. Rather, a component of the directorofficer-shareholder corporate law triumvirate is housed in a different entity
entirely (the adviser), and together the investment adviser and the company
constitute the equivalent of a single corporate person. By not
acknowledging the adviser-investment company relationship, Janus
imports to securities regulation considerations of formalities and
separateness that are at home only in the corporate governance realm.204
201. See id. at 2302 (“[S]uits [] against entities that contribute ‘substantial assistance’ to the
making of a statement but do not actually make it [] may be brought by the SEC . . . but not by private
parties.”) (citations omitted).
202. Id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
203. Id.
204. The dissent appropriately eschewed reliance on the corporate governance paradigm but did
not fully articulate the special relationship between adviser and investment company. In particular,
Justice Breyer compared an adviser’s relationship to the investment company to that between corporate
managers and the corporation. See id. at 2307 (“The English language does not impose upon the word
‘make’ boundaries of the kind the majority find determinative. Every day, hosts of corporate officials
make statements with content that more senior officials or the board of directors have ‘ultimate
authority’ to control.”). Accordingly, just as an executive can make statements attributable to the
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***
Parts III and IV set forth (very different) ways in which the corporate
governance paradigm thwarts the objectives of securities regulation. The
paradigm produces ineffective investment company management and
oversight, inappropriate judicial reliance on state corporate governance
norms, and undue emphasis on the sanctity of the entity—all to the
detriment of investment company shareholders. The theme that may be
distilled from the this discussion is that regulatory reliance on the corporate
governance paradigm is counterproductive: boards of directors are
ineffective in carrying out their decisionmaking and oversight functions, at
least relative to their operating company counterparts, largely because they
are dependent on, and defer excessively to, investment advisers. Investment
advisers, for their part, may be motivated as much—if not more—by
desires to maintain or increase fee levels as by achieving strong long-term
performance. Finally, shareholders, fully aware that “selling” their shares
means nothing more than selling them back to the issuer without any
prospect of realizing a control premium, arguably perceive scant reward in
monitoring their investment company positions.205 If this state of affairs is
not corporate governance at its best, it surely cannot be securities
regulation at its best.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF REGULATION
The corporate governance model of investment company regulation is
one possible regulatory approach. That model relies on the circumstance
that investment companies are formally structured like operating
companies, in that they are governed by boards of directors who, as
fiduciaries, represent and speak for the investment company, including in
negotiating an advisory contract with the company’s investment adviser,
overseeing the adviser’s activities, and monitoring the adviser’s potential
conflicts of interest relating to the company.206 Regulation in this model
specifies how directors’ monitoring functions are to be carried out and the
constraints on investment advisers’ discretionary activities, all with a view
corporation that employs him, an investment company’s statements can be attributable to its investment
adviser. See id. at 2312. With that comparison, however, Justice Breyer suggested that an investment
company is, in some sense, an agent of the investment adviser—or, in First Derivative’s framework, the
actor speaking the playwright’s words. That analogy is likewise inapt, however, because it squarely
contradicts the adviser’s actual, formal status as an agent of the investment company.
205. Langevoort, supra note 8, at 1031 (observing that “in the world of mutual funds” neither
“power of institutional investors who can actually threaten to exercise their voting rights” nor “a
reasonably active market for corporate control” exist in any meaningful way).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 69–74.
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toward ensuring that, in this assumed business enterprise, those in control
are adequately accountable to those in the position of passive owner.207
This model seeks to achieve the goals of securities regulation through a
regulatory regime grounded in the rules and norms of corporate
governance—rather than securities regulation—and fails in that effort.208
Accordingly, as this part discusses, better regulation of investment
companies could be achieved by recognizing that that regulation should be
placed within the auspices of securities regulation.
A. THE FINANCIAL SERVICES PARADIGM
As discussed above, the prospect that corporate law may not be the
appropriate model for investment company regulation becomes evident
when we evaluate how investment companies have shed their operating
company roots and today hardly resemble their predecessors.209 In that
regard, perhaps most important is the relatively straightforward matter of
how an investment company comes to be, particularly as compared with
the inception process for operating companies. In the operating company
context, one or more entrepreneurs determine to organize production
through a corporation, which, governed by corporate law, generally
involves a governing board of directors and one or more shareholders, who
may be active participants in the business or passive investors.210 From that
basic determination almost naturally derives corporate governance
concerns and decisions, involving maintaining a balance between the firm’s
ability to adapt to new circumstances and its accountability to
shareholders.211 On an ongoing basis, shareholders evaluate their continued
holdings in the company based on its particular activities—the services it
provides or the products it produces—and its management’s ability to
exploit those activities to the company’s best financial advantage.212
Shareholders’ analyses revolve around what the company is and does that
sets it apart from its competitors or from other potential investments
(generally thought to be evident in the company’s share price).213
207. See supra text accompanying notes 32–35.
208. See supra Parts III & IV.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 36–41.
210. O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 50, at 153–58.
211. See id. at 15.
212. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, A New Legal Theory to Test Executive Pay: Contractual
Unconscionability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1187 (2011) (“For centuries, shareholders have been seen as
interested in maximization of firm profits and managerial performance was evaluated in those terms.”).
213. Id. (“Beginning in the 1960s, it became fashionable to . . . see stock market price as a proxy
for both the shareholder interest and firm value.”).
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In the investment company context, whether in the United States or
elsewhere, the “entrepreneur” is typically the investment adviser, with
hopes of managing an investment company with substantial assets and,
therefore, the ability to generate sizable fees. In the United States, that
investment adviser then forms the investment company and effectively sets
the terms under which the company will operate (subject, of course, to
compliance with the ICA and SEC regulations).214 Among other things,
therefore, the investment adviser chooses the company’s name, selects its
board of directors, determines its share class structure, and dictates the
content of its certificate of incorporation or other constitutive document.215
Beyond that, the adviser also selects the other service providers to the
company—its auditor, distributor, and administrator, for example—
negotiates their services contracts on behalf of the company, and oversees
the service providers’ performance of their responsibilities.216 However, the
adviser has no real role within the enterprise given that that the adviser
does not occupy one of the three defining roles within a company: it is
neither a director, nor an officer, nor a shareholder. Rather, the adviser’s
relationship with the company is merely contractual in nature, governed by
the investment-advisory agreement between the adviser and the company,
the terms of which are largely proposed by the adviser and formally ratified
by the board of directors.217
Moreover, the relationship between the entrepreneur and the
shareholders differs from that in the operating company context.
Shareholder analysis of an investment company does not depend on what
the company does or produces, as it neither does anything nor produces
anything that is not reducible to the controlling influence of the investment
adviser. The investment company’s success depends on the ability of the
investment adviser to achieve the goals established for the investment
company, including to make decisions that increase, rather than reduce, the
value of the assets that shareholders have invested.218 That means that the
214. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480–81 (1979) (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 5 (1969),
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N 4897, 4901) (“[M]utual funds, with rare exception, are not operated by
their own employees. Most are formed, sold, and managed by external organizations, [called
‘investment advisers,’] that are separately owned and operated . . . .”).
215. Cf. id. at 481 (noting that the investment adviser of a “typical” investment company provides
the company “with almost all management services”).
216. Cf. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The adviser . . . operates or
supervises most of the . . . phases of the fund’s business.”).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 42–46.
218. See Tannenbaum, 552 F.2d at 405. (“The management of [an investment company] is largely
in the hands of an investment adviser . . . . [which] either selects or recommends the fund’s investments
and rate of portfolio turnover . . . .”).
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entity itself is subordinate to the role of the investment adviser—and, with
the diminished significance of the entity and its activities, there arises a
more direct connection between the investment adviser and shareholders.
Shareholders invest their capital in an investment company because of the
investment adviser, whether on the basis of its reputation or its
performance or, perhaps, its popularity; the investment adviser, in turn,
provides services to those shareholders.219 To be sure, those services are
provided indirectly, through an intermediating entity (the investment
company), but the entity serves merely a facilitating function. It is but an
instrument.
Accordingly, a shareholder’s investment in an investment company
effectively establishes a services relationship between the shareholder and
the investment adviser that manages the company (even though the adviser
does not have a direct or personal relationship with each shareholder to
whom it provides its services). As discussed further below, that
characterization also suggests that the investment constitutes something
different than the shareholder’s simply buying a financial product, akin to a
certificate of deposit or a credit-default swap. Moreover, with that
characterization in mind, one might be less inclined to think that an
approach based on the legacy of operating companies is an ideal approach.
Instead, it would seem that regulation of investment companies should pay
greater attention to investment advisers’ responsibilities, including to
manage client assets in accordance with the relevant investment objectives,
to place client interests ahead of their own, to manage and mitigate
conflicts of interest, to disclose material facts to clients, and to provide
clients with information about their portfolio holdings on an ongoing
basis.220
219. See Craig S. Tyle & Young Seo, The Revolution in Investment Company Governance: New
SEC Rules & the Challenge of Implementation, in PRACTICING LAW INST., MUTUAL FUND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 563, 584 (2004) (observing that “[w]hen investors become shareholders of a fund, they
have already made a deliberate decision to select an investment manager whom they believe will
implement their investment strategy and provide shareholder services suitable to their needs at an
acceptable cost” and that “[i]nvestors do not expect the fund’s directors to choose a new manager for
them except in very unusual circumstances”); Ben L. Fernandez, The Duties of Mutual Fund Trustees
With Respect to the Investment Advisory Fee 41-APR B.B.J. 12, 13 (1997) (“[Mutual fund] shareholders
effectively choose the investment adviser by investing in the fund.”).
220. This approach is consistent with sentiments expressed by industry professionals, including
Eric Roiter, in his capacity as a senior vice president of Fidelity Management & Research Company:
Mutual funds, although taking separate legal form as corporations or business trusts, do
not produce goods or deliver services. Rather, mutual funds are the vehicles through which
investors consume a service. That service is collective investment management provided by
the fund’s adviser. A mutual fund, while having a separate legal existence, in its most
fundamental sense is essentially a means by which consumers jointly obtain the services of an
investment adviser. In contrast to distinct groups of shareholders and customers of an
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If those responsibilities should be the focus of investment company
regulation, then we are directed toward a model of regulation that
substantially resembles the regulation governing investment advisers’
relationships with “clients” that are not investment companies (or
investment company shareholders) but that instead are individuals or
institutions that have engaged the adviser to directly manage their assets (in
a nonpooled manner), separately from the assets of any other client. In the
direct-client context, the obligations fall squarely on the shoulders of the
investment adviser.221 Applied to investment companies, this model would
render the adviser responsible for its own actions and inactions, including
its engaging in “conflict” transactions with or on behalf of the investment
company or its charging the investment company a fee in excess of what is
normal in the market. The adviser, moreover, would be directly answerable
to regulators for its missteps, and possibly also to shareholders, to the
extent that the regulatory regime endows them with a private right of
action. In this picture, the board of directors has been excised, as has any
possibility that the investment adviser may engage in questionable
activities or transactions simply by virtue of having obtained official board
approval or ratification of them.
In such an alternative approach, then, whether the investment
company has a board of directors and, presumably, the structure of the
investment company, would be irrelevant. Instead, the investment adviser
would be the sole repository of investment company governance, and
regulation would focus on the position of the investment adviser vis-à-vis
the investment company’s shareholders and, more importantly, the nature
of the adviser’s relationship to the investment company. Ultimately, this
approach would regard that relationship as just one type of relationship
among many in which an investment adviser provides services to “clients,”
with the clients in this case (functionally, if not formally) being the
shareholders that invest, collectively, in a “pool” that the adviser then
manages as a single account. With that understanding of the adviser’s role
as the basis of regulation, regulatory requirements should be directed
operating company, there is complete convergence among shareholders and customers of a
mutual fund. They are one and the same group.
Eric D. Roiter, Senior Vice President and Gen. Counsel of Fidelity Mgmt. & Research Co., An Apology
for Mutual Funds: Delivering Fiduciary Services to Middle and Working Class Investors, Remarks
Before the Annual Review of Banking and Financial Law Annual Dinner (March 29, 2004), in 23 ANN.
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 851, 860 (2004).
221. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2006) (requiring
investment advisers to register with the SEC, with that registration subject to suspension or revocation
for improper behavior, prohibiting them from effecting certain types of transactions, and imposing
various other obligations).
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almost exclusively toward the investment adviser and specify what is to be
done and what is not to be done in connection with the adviser’s managing
the investment company’s assets, communicating with shareholders,
engaging in personal securities transactions, managing other client
accounts, and so forth.
To be sure, this alternative approach to regulation—which may aptly
be called a “financial services” approach and which prevails in the
European Union222—embodies certain similarities to the U.S. corporate
governance approach. For example, both recognize and impose on
investment advisers certain transaction-related restrictions designed to
mitigate or eliminate conflicts of interest.223 However, the models are
largely dissimilar overall, given the importance that the corporate
governance model places on oversight by boards of directors and the fact
that the financial services model would provide no regulatory role for
boards of directors. For example, the European Union’s regulation of
UCITS (essentially, publicly offered, open-end investment companies224)
makes no mention of directors, nor does it suggest that investment
companies themselves (through a board of directors or other governance
mechanism) should play a role in management-type activities. Indeed, the
E.U. Directive setting forth investment company regulation notes that
investment companies need not even be structured as “companies.”225
Rather, “[s]uch undertakings may be constituted according to law, either
under the law of contract (as common funds managed by management
companies) or trust law (as unit trusts) or under statute (as investment
companies).”226
222. The financial services regulatory approach has been embraced by other countries as well. See
Palmiter, supra note 5, at 205 (observing that “[t]he regulatory focus [in most other countries] is on the
management firm, not the investment pool or its legal supervisor” and, further, that, in those countries,
regulation of fees, management services, custodial arrangements, and fund marketing “is a matter of
government agency supervision, with residual oversight by self-regulatory organizations and courts
under a regime of fiduciary duties that fall on the management firm”).
223. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (prohibiting transactions on behalf of clients where the investment
adviser acts as a principal for its own account, unless the adviser first obtains the clients’ written
consent); Council Directive 85/611, On the Coordination of Laws, Regulations, and Administrative
Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS), art.
5f § 2, 1985 O.J. (L 375) 3 (EC), at *11 (as amended) [hereinafter E.U. Directive], available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1985L0611:20080320:
EN:PDF (“Each management company the authorisation of which also covers . . . discretionary
portfolio management service[s] . . . shall not be permitted to invest all or a part of the investor’s
portfolio in units of unit trusts/common funds or of investment companies [the management company]
manages, unless it receives prior general approval from the client.”).
224. See E.U. Directive, supra note 223, art. 2 § 1, at *5.
225. See id. art. 1 § 3, at *3.
226. Id.
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The Directive speaks only in terms of the “management company”
(the investment-advisory firm that manages the investment company), the
investment company itself, and the unitholders (shareholders) of the
investment company.227 The management company, which must be
authorized as such by its member country,228 bears the primary regulatory
compliance obligations, as specified by the relevant member country.
Those obligations must, among other things, require authorized
management companies to maintain adequate administrative and
accounting procedures and trading policies governing transactions by
management company affiliates and to take steps to minimize conflicts of
interests between the management company and its clients.229 The
obligations to which the investment companies themselves are subject, by
contrast, consist largely of investment restrictions—for example,
requirements that an investment company invest only in transferable
securities and certain other instruments, concentration limitations, and
prohibitions on borrowing.230 Those activities are, by definition, controlled
by the relevant management company. Accordingly, it is effectively the
management company’s responsibility to ensure the investment company’s
compliance with the company’s regulatory obligations.
Although it may at first appear that eliminating the independent check
on management actions would exacerbate regulatory difficulties, in fact the
opposite would likely hold in practice. After all, no independent voice
would mean that regulators would not rely on investment company “selfregulation” as a mechanism of client (investor) protection but, rather,
would signify that, as with any other investment-advisory “client,” the
investment adviser is responsible to the regulatory authority for its actions
in relation to the persons whose assets it manages. So, for example, unable
to rely on an independent (albeit controlled) board of directors for the
formal approval of the fees an investment adviser desires to charge the
investment companies it manages, the adviser would be forced to adhere to
applicable laws and regulations regarding excessive fees. In other words, it
would not be able to hide behind the shield of authorization of independent
fiduciaries. Similarly, in questions about the appropriateness of
shareholders’ proposed arbitrage transactions, investment advisers would
be held directly accountable for the arrangements that they make with those
shareholders and for the conflicts of interest on which those arrangements
227.
228.
229.
230.

See, e.g., id. art. 1a § 2, at *4.
Id. art. 5 § 1, at *6.
See id. art. 5f § 1, at *10.
See id. art. 19, at 20–23.
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are based.
B. BUILDING ON THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The financial services paradigm recognizes that the regulation of
investment companies is not a matter of corporate governance. Under the
financial services approach, the investment adviser is obligated to carry out
its activities relating to an investment company in compliance with
applicable laws and rules, which set forth obligations not unlike those
governing an adviser’s management of accounts held by individuals,
foundations, endowments, pension plans, and others who are not
investment companies. This approach does not attempt to attribute to the
investment company a regulatory or governance “voice” independent of the
investment adviser’s. The appeal of this regulatory approach is that it is
more coherent, and ultimately would be more effective, than regulation
based on the corporate governance paradigm. Based on the contours of the
financial services model outlined so far, however, the nature of the
shareholder’s relationship to the investment company, on one hand, and to
the adviser, on the other, is not necessarily apparent. Accordingly, this
section further builds the model’s conceptual framework.
1. Investment Company and Shareholder
In the name of securities regulatory goals, this Article has critiqued
the corporate governance model of regulation and proposed to eliminate the
regulatory role of boards of directors in favor of more direct regulation of
investment advisers. Without more, it is not apparent that this alternative
model of regulation fits any more comfortably within the “securities
regulation” fold than does the corporate governance model. Indeed, others
who have proposed dismantling the corporate governance mode of
regulation by eliminating boards’ role and directing regulation at advisers
would have investment company regulation instead be a form of product
regulation, rather than securities regulation. In particular, John Morley and
Quinn Curtis, in their own critique of U.S. investment company regulation,
endorse product-style regulation based on their observation that investors
transact in investment company shares much as they act as consumers of
auto tires or breakfast cereal.231 Conceptually, the difference between the
two modes of regulation—product and securities—lies in the role provided
231. See Morley & Curtis, supra note 87, at 112. Accord Fisch, supra note 15, at 2028–30
(arguing that “[m]utual funds and comparable alternatives should be regulated as products, not
investments” and proposing product-like regulation based on a “conform or explain” approach).
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for shareholders: whereas securities regulation is premised on the
importance of investor monitoring and, toward that end, supplying
information to investors about how their capital is deployed and by whom,
product-style regulation envisions that investors (as “consumers”) have no
ongoing monitoring role or informational needs.
In reaching their conclusion, Morley and Curtis focus on shareholders’
exit rights and, in particular, the circumstance that the redemption price for
investment company shares reflects only the shares’ current net asset value
and does not take into account the investment company’s expected
returns.232 Accordingly, they note, shareholders in investment companies
with relatively low expected returns will have no incentive to seek to
improve the company’s returns through exercising voting rights or suing
the investment adviser under the ICA for excessive fees.233 Rather, they
will prefer to redeem their shares and move to an investment company with
a higher expected return.234 Because investment company shareholders do
not use fee liability and voting rights, in Morley and Curtis’s alternative
conception of regulation, any role for shareholders would be excised.
Shareholders would have neither voting rights nor the ability to bring
actions for excessive fees (outside of the contexts of fraud, misconduct, or
inadequate disclosure).235 Such elimination of any role for shareholders is
consistent with viewing investment companies as products and a necessary
predicate for product-style regulation. After all, according to Morley and
Curtis, “If . . . it was believed that the price of certain auto tires was too
high or the quality was too low, the sensible solution would not be to allow
tire consumers to sue for excessive prices or to empower them to set prices
and quality by vote.”236 Instead, they contend, regulation should address
quality directly (through direct regulation of investment advisers) and
encourage price competition, through encouraging shareholders’ effective
232. See Morley & Curtis, supra note 87, at 89. As the authors note, the net asset value does
include the expected returns of the securities the investment company holds in its portfolio, but does not
include the expected return of the investment company itself, “which includes expected fees and
expected changes to the fund’s portfolio as well as the expected returns of the securities already in the
portfolio.” Id. at 103.
233. See id. at 89.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 142. Donald Langevoort also uses the product analogy but in a descriptive, rather
than a prescriptive, fashion. In particular, he observes that board passivity may be attributed to boards’
regarding investment company investments as products that consumers are able to effectively evaluate
based on the available information. Langevoort, supra note 8, at 1031–40. In that world of consumer
sovereignty, Langevoort observes, boards do not regard themselves as having robust fiduciary
obligations, with the predictable result that they are less active shareholder advocates than would be the
case in the operating company context. Id.
236. Morley & Curtis, supra note 87, at 131.
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exercise of exit rights.237
Morley and Curtis’s conception of regulation rightly rejects reliance
on corporate governance norms and, therefore, correctly eschews the entity
centrism of the corporate governance model. However, it overstates the
case for removing any role for shareholders. The foundation for their
argument is the notion that investment company shareholders are at an
advantage in exiting an investment company, as compared with operating
company shareholders wishing to dispose of their shares, because the
former may redeem and purchase shares at prices that do not reflect
expected returns.238 If expected returns were reflected in share prices, then
redemption prices in a low expectation investment company would be low,
and purchase prices in a high-expectation investment company would be
high, even if the net asset values of the two companies were the same.239
To place such weight on the circumstance that shareholders receive no
more and no less than the current net asset value of their shares requires as
a premise that shareholders base their decisions to invest in or exit any
particular investment company on the company’s past returns and the
amount of advisory fees the company pays. With that premise, it is not
difficult to view investment companies as products and to seek to regulate
them accordingly, including by removing any role for shareholders.
That premise is questionable at best, however, because it assumes that
the investment adviser is wholly irrelevant. That is, the notion that the only
relevant factors for shareholders are what they “get” from an investment
company in terms of returns and low fees counterfactually ignores the
fundamental role of investment advisers in creating investment companies
and marketing them as avenues through which investors may obtain the
benefit of the advisers’ services and expertise. Investment company
shareholders, not unlike investment advisers’ direct clients, choose where
to place their capital at least in part based on what adviser will be managing
it, as well as the adviser’s reputation, investment strategies, track record,
management team, and so on.240 Unlike buying a product, when investors
place capital in an investment company, they are putting that capital at risk,
and one basis for evaluating that risk is information about the adviser into
237. Id. at 131–32, 142.
238. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
239. See Morley & Curtis, supra note 87, at 89.
240. See William J. Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 179,
223 (1971) (“[M]ost independent directors believe that fund shareholders have purchased a package of
investment management services based upon the strength of a particular adviser’s reputation.”); Tyle &
Seo, supra note 219, at 584.
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whose hands the capital will be (indirectly) placed.241 In other words, once
investors put capital in an investment company, they have done something
different from buying a tire. They have engaged a financial services
professional to manage their assets on their behalf. That act can be seen as
having established an advisory relationship between shareholders and
adviser, albeit one that is attenuated (yet also enabled) by the investment
company itself.
In addition to returns and fee rates, the ups and downs of that
mediated services relationship inform shareholders’ decisions to redeem
shares. When a shareholder believes the advisory services provided are no
longer well suited to the shareholder’s financial needs, the shareholder may
terminate the services relationship by redeeming the shares, much as a
direct advisory client may terminate the contract with the adviser at any
time. Because of the critical role the investment adviser plays in the
investment company structure, including as a component of shareholders’
evaluation of investment alternatives, exit rights arguably do not do the
work that would allow resorting to a product-style regulatory model. The
investment adviser should be the subject of regulation for the purpose of
providing services to the investment company directly and to shareholders
indirectly. The flip side of that coin is that the shareholders should have
certain rights, as shareholders, such as to receive disclosure about, and to
have a say in, how their invested capital is faring under the adviser’s
management. In other words, the shareholders should be entitled to
protections as investors, which is the hallmark of securities regulation.
2. Investment Adviser and Shareholder
The comparison between direct advisory clients and investment
company shareholders allowed by the financial services model may
reasonably raise questions about the identity of the adviser’s “client” for
purposes of regulation governing investment advisers. Beyond investment
advisers’ role in the investment company regulatory structure, after all,
investment advisers are regulated as investment advisers in connection with
all of their advisory activities (whether or not involving investment
companies).242 In that regulation, advisers’ obligations are owed to those
who are their “clients”—and, under the corporate governance paradigm, an
241. That principle is reflected, among other places, in the SEC’s rules under the Advisers Act,
which require that investment advisers provide to their clients comprehensive disclosures about
themselves and their operations, both at the time of the initial engagement and on an annual basis
thereafter. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-3(a), (c) (2009).
242. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2006).
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investment company (and not its shareholders) is deemed to be the advisory
client.243 This Article has attempted to establish that more effective
investment company regulation would result from establishing a more
direct regulatory relationship between investment advisers and investment
company shareholders and by eliminating the regulatory role of boards of
directors. Accordingly, it is worth considering whether that rearrangement
of relationships implies that the investment company should be disregarded
altogether for regulatory purposes and that shareholders should be deemed
the adviser’s clients, as though there were in fact a direct and
unintermediated relationship between adviser and shareholders.
If only intuitively, that would seem an impossible result, given that
advisers to investment companies typically have no direct relationships
with shareholders and that investment companies—being public—are not
limited in the number of shareholders they may have.244 Indeed, at any
given time, an investment company may have hundreds, if not thousands,
of shareholders.245 Fortunately, then, as the rest of this section elaborates,
this Article’s analysis need not affect the who or the what that is deemed
the client of the investment adviser to an investment company—but not for
the reasons one might suppose. In particular, and resonating with the
intuition articulated above, one formidable obstacle to a shift to viewing
shareholders as the adviser’s clients may at first seem to be the oft-repeated
notion that an investment adviser’s advice is necessarily personal, tailored
to the particular needs and circumstances of each client. This notion has
taken hold in regulatory lore, particularly given language in judicial
decisions and regulatory releases that appear to support it.246 For example,
the Supreme Court, in Lowe v. SEC, observed, based on its understanding
of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”) and its history,
that the Act was “designed to apply to those persons . . . who provide
243. E.g., Definition of “Client” of Investment Adviser for Certain Purposes Relating to Limited
Partnerships, 50 Fed. Reg. 8740, 8741 (Mar. 5, 1985) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275) (“[A]n investment
company organized as a corporation, rather than each of its stockholders, is generally regarded as the
client of the company’s investment adviser.”).
244. Alan L. Kennard, The Hedge Fund Versus the Mutual Fund, 57 TAX. LAW. 133, 133 (2003)
(“A mutual fund . . . usually has an unlimited number of investors [and] is available to the general
public . . . .”).
245. Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Case for Curtailing Dead-Hand Control: the American Law
Institute Declares the Perpetual-Trust Movement Ill Advised (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law Working Paper
No. 199, 2010), reprinted in RAYMOND H. YOUNG, ALI-ABA, REPRESENTING ESTATE AND TRUST
BENEFICIARIES AND FIDUCIARIES *11, *13 (ALI-ABA Continuing Legal Educ. Course of Study SS004
ALI-ABA 791, 2010) (observing that a “mutual fund” may have “thousands upon thousands of
shareholders”).
246. See Krug, supra note 63, at 44–51.
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personalized advice attuned to a client’s concerns.”247
In other contexts involving “pools” of capital where we might
consider who should appropriately be deemed the adviser’s client for
regulatory purposes, this understanding of the adviser-client relationship is
not formidably challenged (though, to be sure, has to be addressed). For
example, in the context of regulation of advisers to hedge funds, private
equity funds, and other private funds—that is, investment companies that
are not registered as such under the ICA—the fund, rather than the
investors holding interests in it, has traditionally been regarded as the
“client” for purposes of the advisers’ obligations under the Advisers Act.248
However, a private fund, in offering its interests, must comply with the
private-placement rules under Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933,
which means the fund may offer interests only to persons meeting specified
wealth or income thresholds and with whom the fund (through its adviser
or general partner or other control person) has a preexisting relationship.249
The need for the offering to meet the requirements of the private-placement
rules means that the fund’s adviser, as the person that controls and speaks
for the fund, typically has a personal relationship with each person who
buys interests in the fund and thereby becomes an investor.250
Given certain anomalies that arise from regarding the fund as the
“client,” combined with the relationship that typically exists between the
fund’s adviser and the fund’s investors, there are good reasons for
regulation to regard the investors, rather than the fund, as the clients of the
adviser, at least for purposes of the adviser’s compliance with a number of
obligations under the Advisers Act.251 In a sense, the adviser-investor
relationship in the private-fund context is not particularly different from the
relationship that adviser might have to those with whom it has a direct
advisory relationship (that is, where no fund is involved).252 However, that
is not the situation in the context of publicly registered investment
companies because those investment companies need not comply with the
247. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 182, 207–08 (1985).
248. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1 (“A limited partnership or limited liability company is
a client of any general partner, managing member or other person acting as investment adviser to the
partnership or limited liability company.”).
249. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(e)(1)(iv), 230.506.
250. Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should Encourage
Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 134 (2010) (noting that the SEC’s approach to the Regulation
D “safe harbor” “focuses on whether [the issuer has] a preexisting relationship with each offeree” of
securities).
251. See Krug, supra note 63, at 27–36.
252. See id. at 27–31.
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private-placement rules and, accordingly, neither an investment company
nor its investment adviser needs to have any preexisting relationship or
other personal connection with any particular person that may want to buy
interests in the investment company.253 This means that, in thinking about
the identity of the investment adviser’s client under the financial services
model of investment company regulation, questions concerning the extent
to which an adviser’s investment adviser needs to be “personal” and
“tailored”—and, indeed, whether the adviser need have any relationship at
all with its “clients”—are more acute.
This author, for one, has argued that, at least in the United States, in
light of the history of U.S. regulation of investment advisers and the text of
the Advisers Act, adviser-client relationships in fact need not be personal
relationships and that an adviser may effectively establish an advisory
relationship with persons to whom it merely distributes impersonal reports
and analyses.254 Whether that analysis extends to the relationship between
an adviser and investment company shareholders such that shareholders
should be deemed advisory clients seems a dubious proposition, however.
For one thing, regardless of the extent to which an adviser’s advice need be
“personal” or tailored to the specific needs of each of its clients, intuitively
there has to be, at the least, a channel of recognition and awareness
between adviser and client. In the private-fund context, that relationship is
readily established.255 It is a more difficult case to make in the (public)
investment company context, however, given the public nature of the
company and the fact that, ultimately, shareholders engage the adviser
indirectly, by purchasing shares through the investment company’s
distributors.
Conceivably, the current structure could be modified to create a more
direct connection between advisers and shareholders. Ultimately, however,
the efficacy of the financial services model does not require it. Focusing
regulation on the investment adviser (and leaving the board out of the
picture) has no necessary implications for the identity of the adviser’s client
for purposes of the adviser’s own regulatory obligations. It means only that
the adviser is now the direct target of those obligations, with no selfregulatory role provided by a board of directors. Under both the corporate
253. See supra text accompanying notes 245–46.
254. See Krug, supra note 63, at 44–51; Arthur B. Laby, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau
and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1051, 1081–82 (2011) (observing that
Congress, in formulating the Advisers Act, recognized that not all investment company advisory
relationships were “personalized, confidential relationships”).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 251–52.
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governance and the financial services models, however, those
obligations—the purpose of the regulation—are for the benefit of the
investment company, as an aggregation of capital contributed by the
company’s disparate shareholders. In the private-fund context, given that,
by definition, only the investment adviser, and not the fund itself, is the
focus of regulatory obligations,256 there necessarily remains a concern
about investors’ rights and entitlements as such—for example, rights to
periodic disclosures and voting and consent rights. In that context,
therefore, it is appropriate to consider whether fund investors should be
regarded, at least in some respects, as clients of the fund’s adviser.
However, and importantly, that concern is more readily dispensed with in
the (public) investment company context, where investors’ rights and
entitlements can be articulated, to any degree of specificity deemed
appropriate, as part of the investment company regulatory structure.257
VI. CONCLUSION
The corporate governance paradigm has given rise to a number of
regulatory weaknesses, which stem most directly from investment advisers’
control over investment company boards of directors. Boards have failed to
exert meaningful dissent to the manner in which advisers carry out
investment company operations or to specific requests that advisers make,
such as regarding the fees they charge and special redemptions rights for
favored shareholders. Moreover, in the investment company context, the
traditional oversight function of a corporate board does not exist—not
because boards are incompetent but, rather, because that function cannot
exist given how investment companies are structured. Investment
companies are not simply another type of business enterprise. They
effectively outsource all services and responsibilities. The result is that
boards do not technically oversee anything but instead simply react to
matters that others (investment advisers) have deemed important enough to
report to the board for consideration. We might say that investment
company boards of directors provide “oversight” of a veritable black box.
The U.S. investment company regulatory regime should recognize the
256. The exemptions on which private funds rely are set forth in § 3(c)(1) and § 3(c)(7) of the
ICA. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c)(1), (c)(7) (providing an exemption
from the definition of “investment company” for purposes of ICA’s registration requirements for funds
that do not offer their securities publicly and meet certain other requirements); Krug, supra note 63, at 4
n.12.
257. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29 (setting forth periodic disclosures required of mutual funds and
other registered investment companies).
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distinction between investment companies and operating companies. It
should recognize that investment companies are an instrument that
investment advisers use to provide investment advice to those who seek it.
Toward that end, this Article proposes the dismantling of corporate law
constructs in investment company regulation as a means of producing more
effective regulation and, therefore, more effective protection of investors,
which remains the primary objective of securities regulation. In particular,
regulation should be based on the financial services model, both to avoid
the infirmities of an “independent” board and to foster greater coherence in
securities regulation. Importantly, however, this Article makes no claims
about what the substantive obligations of that regulation under that model
should be—either regarding substantive regulatory requirements governing
investment advisers or the types of activities in which investment
companies are able to engage.
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